How successful have post-war reforms to the Afghan National Police (ANP) been? What strategies should be adopted to improve the structure and performance of the ANP? This paper from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) provides an overview of the police sector and identifies five key issues that need to be addressed. The reforms have so far been disappointing. Piecemeal initiatives undertaken by donors and the national government have resulted in corruption within the police and mistrust among the Afghan population. Future programmes should focus on developing an over-arching strategy for the ANP, improving trainee recruitment and making donor assistance conditional on reform to the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
The ANP, which consists of several smaller police units, operates under the authority of the MoI. In 2002, international donors committed to participate in reforms to the ANP which, after many years of conflict in Afghanistan, had been left ill-equipped, poorly paid and dominated by factional militias. Germany was initially the key partner in coordinating international reform efforts, although its presence will be subsumed within the new EU police (EUPOL) mission this year. The US provides the largest financial assistance: about $2.5 billion in 2007. Although the Afghan government and international donors agreed in 2006 to limit the force to 62,000 members, the US later successfully lobbied for a 20,000-strong increase to help combat the Taliban insurgency.
Despite some notable achievements, the overall result of police reform efforts during the past five years has been disappointing, and many Afghans still perceive the ANP to be part of the security problem rather than part of the solution:
- Training has been complicated by high levels of illiteracy among recruits and the expense of mentoring projects by foreign trainers. Although policemen are better equipped now than in 2002, their kit is difficult to maintain and frequently stolen from ANP stores.
- Restructuring initiatives have succeeded in improving payroll administration. However, more meritocratic selection procedures were undermined by President Karzai’s appointment of several ill-suited senior officers, who were eventually replaced.
- Tensions between international donors initially hampered the development of a coherent reform strategy, with Germany’s vision of the ANP as a civilian force conflicting with the American emphasis on the force’s role in the anti-Taliban campaign.
- Difficulties stemming from inadequate coordination among regional police units and between the ANP and other security actors have been compounded by corruption within the MoI.
- The new Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police unit was hastily created to combat the Taliban insurgency. Inadequate training and vetting of recruits to the unit discredited the ANP as a whole.
If police reform is to succeed in Afghanistan, and the big increase in resources to reform the ANP is not to be wasted, the major actors will need to address five key issues:
- Develop a shared vision and strategy for the ANP
- Replace Security Sector Reform (SSR) pillars with an integrated and comprehensive rule-of-law strategy
- Make donor assistance conditional on comprehensive MoI reform
- Prioritise quality of police over quantity
- Prioritise fiscal sustainability of the security sector
