How do you ensure democratic control of military and security institutions? How do you transform them from agents of insecurity to be agents of security for the people of their country? This collaborative research from the Institute of Development Studies, Witwatersrand University and other partner institutions examines the governance of security in developing and former communist countries and makes recommendations as to an emerging best practice.
Most democratic transitions are fragile and non-linear. Bad decisions made at key junctures and adverse domestic, regional or international inputs can have multiplier effects and cause a democratic transition to stall or even be reversed. In this regard, timing is important during transitions and after conflicts. Windows of opportunity need to be exploited by democrats as it is never clear how long democratic opportunities will last. Democratic control of military and security institutions is strategic to democratisation for two reasons. Firstly, these institutions have an intimate relationship to political power. And secondly, their security functions, including the management of insecurities that may be generated by democratisation, are essential for the survival of any democratic state.
One finding that emerges strongly is that there can be no single solution to governing security in transitions, and that careful attention has to be paid to national variations. Other findings include the following:
- Security sector reform cannot take place on its own. It has to be part of a wider reform of politics, governance and the public sector.
- It is desirable to harmonise economic and political reforms as some aspects of economic liberalisation can work against political liberalisation.
- Domestic agreement on the process, phasing and political objectives contributes greatly to success. Hence the role of civil society is a key issue in transitions.
- To establish the principle of democratic control, some competition between civilians and the military may be unavoidable.
- The role of the legislature is critical in the reform and control of the security sector, although this is often possible only after democratic reform itself has taken place.
- Budgetary control is critical: In many authoritarian systems, the security organisations were able to avoid civil control by the expedient of off-budget funding or by raising their own funds through business or criminal activities.
It is not merely that democratic transitions are non-linear, but they are of different types and some become frozen or reversed. The problems tend to be even more complex in post-conflict situations than they are in transitions from authoritarian governance. Nevertheless, although progress has been uneven, in some countries democratic institutions have been brought to bear on security structures in situations where this would have been unthinkable a decade ago.
- State security can only be justified if it is compatible with human security, including that for those most at risk from poverty, discrimination and conflict.
- Peace building cannot be separated from democratisation.
- The most assured way of preventing military and security structures from regressing into agents of insecurity is to build strong mechanisms for democratic accountability and control.
- Policing, court systems and other public order institutions are a vital part of security sector transformation.
- Demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and reintegration (DDRR) should not be seen as a purely technical task. It has political dimensions, which may abort reforms if ignored or mishandled.
- A stable external security environment helps to facilitate effective domestic reform.
