How can Côte d’Ivoire’s descent into violence at the end of the 1990s be explained? This article from the journal ‘Oxford Development Studies’ looks at inter-ethnic or horizontal inequalities and the emergence of violent group mobilisation. It argues that political horizontal inequality at the elite level combined with socio-economic horizontal inequality at the mass level forms an explosive socio-political situation.
When social, economic and political inequalities coincide with cultural differences, culture can become a powerful mobilising agent. Whether these horizontal issues become an issue at the national political level depends on whether national elites decide to instigate processes of grievance formation. Ethnic elites are primarily concerned with the distribution of political power, while ordinary citizens predominantly care about their socio-economic position and progress. The economic and institutional environment is also important.
Côte d’Ivoire became independent in 1960 and Houphouët-Boigny was elected president and remained in office until 1993.
- From 1960-1980 Côte d’Ivoire achieved remarkable economic growth and socio-political stability. The latter was due to Houphouët-Boigny’s approach to politics, characterised by dialogue and compromise; French support; his use of economic incentives to co-opt opponents; and a system of ethnic quotas in state institutions.
- From the 1980s this model deteriorated due to a decline in commodity prices. This reduced living standards and increased ethnic tensions. After protests the president legalised opposition parties and held presidential elections in 1990. The elections were marked by ethno-nationalism and xenophobia.
- Following Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, Henri Bédié took over. He introduced a policy requiring both parents of presidential candidates to be Ivorian, and prohibiting foreigners from voting in elections. This disqualified his main rival, from a different ethnic group, and disenfranchised many in the north.
- He also changed the ethnic composition of state institutions and the armed forces in favour of his own ethnic group. After another economic downturn in 1999, discontent in the military led to a military coup, removing Bédié from power.
- The leader of the coup, Robert Gueï, also used ethnic ideas to exclude his opponents. The winner of subsequent elections, Laurent Gbagbo, also tried to fill positions in the state institutions and military with people of his own ethnic group, leading to further violence.
This history should be understood in the light of prevailing socioeconomic and political horizontal inequalities.
- Côte d’Ivoire is characterised by a serious socio-economic north-south divide, the north being significantly poorer than the south. During the 1970s, the region received increasing amounts of public investment.
- Between 1994 and 1998 Bédié’s ethnic group, from the south, enjoyed the highest socioeconomic prosperity, and improved their relative socioeconomic position considerably. In 1998, Northern ethnic groups were well below the national average, with one group’s position deteriorating considerably.
- In terms of political inequalities, data shows that during the 1980s the system of ethnic quotas meant that no ethnic groups were excluded from government. After Bédié came to power, the representation of his ethnic group increased considerably, at the expense of Northern groups.
- Similar patterns can be observed for his successors: They increased the representation of their own ethnic groups at the expense of their rivals.
- The period of political stability from 1960-80 shows that inequalities at the mass level are not enough to cause violence. When the economy deteriorated, political leaders used ethnic grievances to build support, horizontal inequalities became politicised, and violence resulted.
- Simultaneous horizontal inequality at the elite and mass level is explosive because excluded elites have the incentive to mobilise supporters for violent conflict. They are also likely to gain such support quite easily.
