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Home»Document Library»Identifying Entry Points of Action in Counter Radicalization

Identifying Entry Points of Action in Counter Radicalization

Library
J Cozzens
2006

Summary

How does the Salafi-Jihadi ideology enable the radicalisation of Muslim militants? How can the international community combat this ideology with counter-narratives promoted through development initiatives? This paper from the Danish Institute for International Studies traces the role of Salafi-Jihadi ideology in recruiting militants, activating them to commit violence and justifying their deeds. It argues that, since ideology is a central motivating factor in violent activism, it should be combated by dialogue which promotes reformist, non-violent narratives among individuals vulnerable to radicalisation.

Ideologies are central to the new type of asymmetrical warfare, involving non-state actors such as al-Qaeda, whose violent campaign is underpinned by Salafi-Jihadi culture. This culture upholds a proactive, violent worldview which advocates jihad (holy war) against the sources of “infidelity” which are “corrupting” Islamic thought.

Unlike Salafi reformists, whose focus is on piety and social activism, Salafi-Jihadi activists target the United States and its “client” Arab regimes promoting “divergence” from their conception of Qu’ranic teachings. Among their objectives are a unified transnational community of “true” Muslims and the waging of jihad as an act of worship.

Five stages in the Salafi-Jihadi radicalisation process are identified and their mode of dissemination examined:

  • ‘Interpretation” provides a militant religious explanation for the ills facing the Muslim community and for the remedy to these afflictions. This ideological element is conveyed mainly by “passive” modes of communication, with wide Muslim audiences targeted via the internet, mosques, publications, schools and itinerant preachers.
  • “Separation” promotes an exclusive “brotherhood” of activist Salafis. Here, ideology is disseminated through more focused, “active” means, on a personal or cell level, where individuals are targeted by friends, relatives, perceived religious authorities and “ghazis” (combat veterans).
  • “Obligation” engenders social reinforcement of the duty to wage jihad. This aspect is also communicated by “active” modes, with online chat forums and one-to-one contact offering social support for the Salafi-Jihadi ideology.
  • “Activation” impels recruits to carry out violent acts by reference to the rewards of martyrdom and God’s battlefield support. It is conveyed by “active” and “passive” means: warrior-clerics’ commentaries on the Qu’ran, “ghazi” religious interpretations and online jihadi literature.
  • “Defending” legitimises violent acts after the fact. The defensive function is conveyed by pre-recorded “martyrs’ wills” and public statements from prominent political figures distributed online or via satellite.

To combat these ideologies, global counter-narratives should be disseminated locally via international cooperation with in-country Muslim groups:

  • To de-bunk jihadist narratives pitting the West against the Muslim world, Islamic and reformist Salafi criticism of Salafi-Jihadi violence should be seized upon.
  • The Organisation of Islamic Conference could support the targeting of young Muslim males with myths, heroes and metaphors that present alternative, credible, moderate narratives about society.
  • A Yemeni initiative to promote dialogue between potential activists and legitimate Muslim scholars on the basis of equality, respect and religion could be broadened.
  • Salafi reformers could be bolstered to undermine the credibility of Salafi-Jihadist teachers who have often undergone little serious religious teaching.
  • The Salafi-Jihadi “brotherhood” could be undermined by highlighting instances of communal treachery and deceit.
  • New rules could be applied to promote “homegrown” Muslim religious leaders in Europe by stipulating better cultural awareness of their adopted homes.
  • “Halfway houses” could be established in conflict zones to counter socialisation processes into Salafi-Jihadi cliques.
  • An international campaign to oppose the broadcasting of Salafi-Jihadist statements and “martyr videos” on worldwide media should be established.

Source

Cozzens, J. B., 2006, 'Identifying Entry Points of Action in Counter Radicalization', DIIS Working Paper 2006, no. 6, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

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