This article notes that conventional security promotion activities such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) are often ineffective because the political, economic and social circumstances on the ground are not yet favourable. This is especially the case in early post-conflict settings when ceasefires and peace agreements have not been signed and when transitional governments have yet to coalesce. It argues that, in certain cases, Interim Stabilisation Measures (ISMs) can help to develop a more favourable context. Findings include the following:
- The use of ISMs will depend very much on specific contextual factors, especially how the conflict ended, the degree to which reconciliation has progressed and the relationship between various combatant groups and the broader society.
- There is still limited empirical research on how contextual factors are likely to influence different kinds of ISMs, and on the most appropriate implementation arrangements (e.g., vetting procedures, management processes and sequencing of activities) for different ISMs.
- A common aspiration of all ISMs is to temporarily hold former combatants in cohesive structures and maintain basic security and social supports in order to “buy time” and “create space” for other pertinent conditions to coalesce.
- ISMs can thus generate opportunities in post-conflict settings such as: (i) facilitating the continuation of political dialogue; (ii) enabling the settlement of outstanding power sharing issues in the political and security arenas; (iii) building trust and confidence amongst parties to enable a political settlement; (iv) constituting provisional administrative structures and legal instruments to promote security and safety; (v) promoting the absorptive capacity of different economic and social sectors of society; (vi) sensitizing communities in advance of more formal DDR and SSR activities; and (vii) enhancing socio-psychological adjustment of combatants as they gradually move towards a fully civilian life or integration into the security services.
- Risks associated with ISMs include: (i) reconstructing oppressive structures or maintaining rebellious units; (ii) providing impunity from justice; (iii) facilitating criminality and maintaining illegal networks; (iv) promoting the continuation of illegitimate control over natural resources; and (v) inadvertently de-legitimating the state by maintaining a separate and semi-intact source of potential authority and coercion.
- Like other peace-building efforts, ISMs also run the risk of creating new dependencies or becoming isolated from other main pillars of the peace-building and state-building processes. These are of course valid concerns that require management and mitigation. They are also common to many interventions during war-to-peace transitions. A key strategy is ensuring that ISMs are implemented under an accepted and largely legitimate civilian authority and are, from day one, accompanied by clear and transparent timelines and sunset clauses. Ultimately, high-risk strategies can also yield high gains that may justify the trade-offs entailed.
