How has the changing political role of Indonesian National Army (TNI) impacted the military’s ability to deal with domestic conflict? This paper examines the impact of the recent reduction of the TNI’s role in politics on its ability to handle ethnic identity problems and violent conflicts. While the TNI has undergone reform since the late 1990s, it still claims a role as a social and political force. TNI presence and influence in politics remains fluid: inadequate state funding of the military and ongoing democratic consolidation issues could provide the army with incentives to force its way back into politics.
At the time of Indonesia’s independence in 1945, the main personnel of its militia, precursor to Indonesia’s national army, were officers educated by the Dutch and Japanese. These officers rejected the Dutch philosophy of a professional military separated from politics and adopted the Japanese philosophy of an army involved in all facets of political, economic and social life. In 1957, declaration of a military emergency to deal with social unrest led to codification of the principle of an absolute role for the military in politics. Until the fall of Suharto in 1998, the Indonesian military had a pervasive political role throughout civil institutions, state apparatus and the business sector.
Since the late 1990s, the political role of TNI has been significantly diminished through structural and legislative change. However, internal conflicts, including separatism issues, social violence and religious and/or ethnic conflicts, have tested the military’s ability to accept a neutral political role.
Research results suggest that the TNI still displays ethnic and religious bias in domestic security situations and continues to conduct itself, albeit more indirectly, as a social and political force.
- Ethnic, social and religious conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Aceh were exacerbated by military distribution of arms to citizens and military ethnic/religious bias while handling unrest. Some security forces used religious symbols to rally communities to support one side of the conflict.
- Ethnic/religious friction within the TNI was evident in clashes between Christian and Muslim battalions. Religious animosity between organic and indigenous elite officers contributed to the escalation of conflicts.
- Legislation to reform the TNI abolished its role in national and local parliaments, severed military association with political parties and called for military neutrality during elections. TNI members and state employees may still participate as candidates in district/municipal elections as long as they are non-active members of their forces. However, they do not have to retire from the military to participate in local politics.
- While the military has dissolved many of its political powers, its organisational structure is still based on Suharto’s Cadek doctrine, which legitimises military involvement in all aspects of social and political life.
Although TNI involvement in politics has been formally diminished, there may be incentives for the TNI to force its way back into politics:
- The state is taking over military businesses but is not providing enough funds for soldiers’ economic welfare. It is unable to finance the minimum defence budget necessary for the minimum military force needed to defend the country.
- If democratic consolidation does not create an environment where military appointments are made on merit rather than through patronage, discontent within the military will increase.
- Continuing civilian interference in military matters could trigger military disobedience.
