How successful has the United States (US) been in achieving political reintegration in Iraq? This study from Conflict, Security and Development examines US approaches to the political reintegration of irregular armed groups, from its initial policy vacuum to the informal reintegration seen during 2007 and 2008. It shows that the best attempt at reintegration has been the arrangements between US military units and Sunni groups since 2006. Yet, since these arrangements emerged without support from the central government, they cannot be considered reconciliation or even reintegration.
Following its overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the US was confronted with a complex statebuilding enterprise. However, initially, the US gave little attention to a central component of statebuilding – the process of transforming armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the country. In the first year in Iraq, the United States did not pursue any strategy to reintegrate either the defeated security forces of the Saddam Hussein regime or the pre-existing militias that opposed it. In the absence of security, the militias and insurgency groups grew. By the time a reintegration strategy emerged, it was irresponsive to political realities and badly implemented. These political realities were themselves a product of the unconditional and ill-advised incorporation of sectarian elements within the Iraq government.
Iraq points to an unavoidable trade-off, inherent to efforts at regime-change. Having only transient support and legitimacy, the occupier must find indigenous authorities to whom power can be transferred, but these national leaders must be effective, representative and accountable. In solving this conundrum, the need for local knowledge cannot be underestimated. In retrospect, it is clear that in Iraq:
- More time was needed to allow representative Iraqi leaders to emerge, through a bottom-up process rather than as appointed by US officials.
- The government set up in 2003 was composed of sectarians and secularists with questionable credentials and has never worked for Iraqi national interests but for individual power-bases.
- Measures designed to undercut the Sunnis’ motivation for violence have had to arise from within structures with a vested interest in perpetuating the problem.
- Successful informal pacts between US military units and Sunni groups since 2006 have allowed formerly alienated elements to claim an active role in providing security and enabling reconstruction.
- The partnership achieved in 2007 between the US military leadership and al-Sadr suggest a pragmatic, yet conditions based, avenue toward reintegration, where commonalities are exploited to meet common goals.
These informal pacts, while bringing about improvements in security, require the Iraqi government support to become embedded. Progress has been too slow, but there are grounds for hope.
- The elections could consolidate the de facto influence of more representative and legitimate Sunni leaders through democratic means, codifying both Sunni rejection of insurgency and lasting status within larger Iraqi society.
- Should al-Sadr pursue his transformation into a legitimate politician, his popular appeal among working-class Iraqis might challenge the sectarian Shia elements currently in government, who are seen as out-of-touch?
- There is a danger that the central government will forcibly seek to marginalise the up-and-coming political leadership that is threatening its hold on power.
- The US will find itself in the middle of this struggle, which will require its continued engagement if the hard-earned progress seen since 2007 is not to be squandered.
