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Home»Document Library»Oversight and Monitoring of Non-State/Private Policing: The Private Security Practitioners in South Africa

Oversight and Monitoring of Non-State/Private Policing: The Private Security Practitioners in South Africa

Library
Anthony Minnaar
2007

Summary

South Africa’s private security industry has grown enormously. However, only state police conduct is formally monitored. This study by the University of South Africa calls for greater monitoring and oversight of the activities of private security operatives. There must be more professional training and greater cooperation with the state police. A formal framework of accountability would allow private police officers to understand their responsibilities and the limitations on their actions.

In South Africa, the current ratio of active private security officers to uniformed police members is 2:1. In some areas private security has replaced public police. Although the private security industry in South Africa is reasonably well regulated there are gaps in the regulations when it comes to oversight and the monitoring of the conduct of operatives. One of the most serious gaps is the fact that none of the South African legislation mentions the direct involvement of private companies in policing services or crime prevention. This creates great problems for monitoring and overseeing the conduct of security practitioners in public policing activities.

In theory, all private security companies are required to register and comply with rules and regulations. However, there are large flaws in the system.

  • There is a shortage of inspectors, a shortage of trained investigators (especially for suspected criminal cases) and poor evidence collecting, which makes it difficult to build cases for prosecution.
  • There is a lack of accurate fingerprinting, address or de-registered company databases. This allows suspended persons to register new companies since there is no ‘block’ linked to their personal particulars.
  • Investigations are largely complaints driven. Most complaints are from staff members or are service-related complaints lodged by clients.
  • Complaints from members of the public are few since they do not know that there is a regulatory body dedicated to the private security industry.
  • There are even fewer criminal complaints and complaints about misconduct involving excessive use of force.
  • Sanctions are difficult to enforce and efforts to impose stricter monitoring is hampered by the fact that subscription to the existing Code of Conduct is voluntary.

If public interest is to be protected, South Africa needs a closely regulated private industry as a counter to existing public policing oversight. The police cannot afford or be seen to abdicate policing responsibilities. It is not a question of privatising crime control, but cooperating in the fight against crime and coordinating joint efforts. In order to acheive this, improvements need to include:

  • Private security provision must operate within the formal structures of the state.
  • Private policing should not replace public policing functions but should supplement and be supportive of overall policing actions.
  • The private security industry will only make its expertise and manpower available if it is paid and if such co-operative actions are protected by the law.
  • A national forum would allow representatives from public police and private security to formulate solutions to problems.
  • A national think-tank could research and recommend policy that can lead to a formal framework within which partnership policing can operate.
  • The national forum can assist government in formulating legislation.

Source

Minnaar, A. (2007). 'Oversight and monitoring of non-state/private policing: The private security practitioners in South Africa', in Gumedze, S. (Ed.) (2007) 'Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation', ISS Monograph Series No 139, November 2007, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, pp. 127-150.

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