How should police oversight be established in Liberia? This study analyses the range of potential oversight mechanisms, examples from other African countries, and Liberia’s situation. It recommends a government-chaired, mixed-membership, multi-tiered system with a broad mandate for enhancing police professionalism and assuring the public. This system should be clear, relatively simple, manageable, and comprehensible to the Liberian people. First, a high-level policy body and a subordinate investigative body should be established, followed in the longer-term by local police forums.
The Liberian National Police (LNP) encompasses most policing functions and services, and has an Emergency Response Unit (ERU). It answers to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). The LNP will become the chief provider of security in Liberia as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is reduced. However, Liberian citizens’ past experience leads them to doubt the competence and integrity of the police.
External oversight needs to be established for three LNP functions: government responsibility, professionalism, and assuring the public. The oversight system should be designed according to the criteria of: (1) manageability (the ease, effectiveness, and consistency of oversight); (2) permanent professionalism (the institutionalisation of high professional standards); and (3) public confidence (the clarity and certainty with which the public knows of police standards, conduct, problems, and remedies).
- These criteria are not of equal importance, and should not be weighted equally.
- The LNP must win citizens’ trust in order to enjoy the cooperation it needs to be effective. Until that happens, citizens will attempt to provide for their own safety.
- The question of credibility and legitimacy is therefore especially crucial for the acceptance and effectiveness of the LNP.
- This concern can be addressed by introducing strong non-governmental participation into police oversight. For example, while the government could chair oversight mechanisms, non-governmental participants could constitute the majority of members.
- By keeping the oversight system as simple as possible (but always consistent with needs), both government manageability and political support – two keys to success – can be strong.
A government-chaired, mixed-membership, multi-tiered oversight system should be established with the authority and competence to: (1) consider every aspect of police policy and performance; and (2) make recommendations that the government would be obligated to consider and address. This oversight system should include a high-level policy body and a subordinate body to investigate individual allegations of police abuse and look for patterns of such behaviour within police agencies. In addition, the groundwork should be laid for the eventual creation of local police forums to promote local connectivity and confidence.
- The Emergency Response Unit (ERU), with different combat capabilities and roles from those of the rest of the LNP, needs special (but not separate) oversight. Both oversight bodies should have explicit guidelines (and possibly subcommittees) governing the ERU.
- The relationship between LNP oversight as proposed and normal MoJ responsibilities for the LNP must be clear and compatible.
- The relationship between LNP oversight and the LNP’s internal control systems must be mutually reinforcing.
- Manageability must be prioritised (through, for example, minimising duplication and red tape).
- Public confidence can be created and enlarged by publicising plans, inviting comment, and involving non-governmental actors from the outset and throughout the process of establishing LNP oversight.
- The MoJ should develop detailed plans for LNP oversight mechanisms, with assistance from outside experts.
