This Institute for Security Studies article provides an overview of the security sector reform processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC’s transitional government faces significant challenges, most notably in the area of security. In particular, the formation of a unified Congolese national army and the necessary disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes for the various armed groups are currently the biggest threats to the transitional government.
The DRC transitional government, which has been in power since June 2003, continues to face significant challenges in implementing crucial aspects of the transition, most notably in the area of security. The establishment of an integrated and operational defence force for the DRC from disparate belligerent groups is critical because, aside from MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) forces, these units will constitute the only ‘legitimate’ deterrent to process spoilers. The lack of reliable and verifiable information on the actual numbers or armament of former belligerent forces is of serious concern.
Peacebuilding in the DRC has been dominated by security and legal/constitutional concerns.
- In addition to the creation of a unified Congolese defence force (FARDC) the Global and All-inclusive Agreement, Part VI provides for the establishment of a superior defence council chaired by the president and charged with guiding and providing advice on the setting up of a restructured and integrated army, as well as on the disarmament of armed groups.
- The draft Defence Law that establishes the FARDC was only recently promulgated (on 12 November 2004) and fails to provide any clarity on the size, operations or functioning of the future integrated army.
- According to the second draft of the national DDR plan, dated 5 March 2004, at present there are up to 330,000 combatants in the DRC, of whom 200,000 need to be demobilised. The plan aims to limit the future combined FARDC to no more than 130,000 people.
- Several donors have pointed to an apparent lack of political will within the transitional government to fully participate and engage in the finalisation and implementation of the national DDR programme.
- The reform and restructuring of the Congolese National Police (PNC) forms an integral part of SSR efforts in the DRC, being a priority for the transitional government. The PNC will probably be limited to between 70,000 and 80,000 personnel.
The challenges and delays facing security sector reform in the DRC are currently the biggest threats to the transitional government.
- The agreement between the DRC, Belgium and South Africa, as well as Angola, to help integrate six brigades before the election (the emergency plan) could help to stabilise the east of the DRC and support the police in safeguarding the elections in June 2005.
- In addition, there are several unanswered questions regarding the FARDC. For example, beyond the emergency plan, what is the strategy for reintegrating and retraining the entire defence force? How is the FARDC to be structured and what will its ultimate force level be?
- Without a commitment by all involved to finding answers to these questions the national DDR programme will not move forward. It is of the utmost importance that MONUC’s SSR cell become operational and effective in coordinating these initiatives.
