Corruption works differently in different political economies and political cultures. Reforms to combat corruption must address local specificities to ensure they are not counter-productive. Following the Southeast Asian economic crisis, this chapter explores political corruption in Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Electoral corruption in each country is described and then interpreted using a critical schema that looks to the value of ‘balance’ to suggest successful reforms.
Political and economic problems are linked and reforms must therefore address both of these areas. Johnston (1997) proposes a model that charts four syndromes of political corruption according to imbalances on two continua: (i)The balance between the accessibility and autonomy of political elites, and (ii) The balance between wealth and power. The Southeast Asian countries can be assessed according to these criteria and specific reform strategies suggested.
The first syndrome of political corruption is ‘interest group bidding’ where elite accessibility exceeds autonomy and economic opportunities are more plentiful than political ones. This is typical of liberal democracies, and there are hints of it in Malaysian political scandals. The result is strong interest groups that use economic pressure to gain political influence over political elites who are vulnerable because of insufficient autonomy.
- The second syndrome is ‘elite hegemony’, where the elite is more autonomous than accessible and political opportunities outweigh economic ones, such as in Singapore.
- The result is an entrenched political elite that faces little competition or demands for accountability. There is a danger of organised ‘hypercorruption’ and reforms may be manipulated to the elite’s political advantage.
- The third syndrome is ‘fragmented patronage/extended factionalism’ where bureaucrats are more accessible than autonomous and political opportunities exceed economic ones. This is emerging in Thailand and the Philippines.
- This is the most politically unstable syndrome and most likely to lead to extreme corruption. Wealth and political success is based on personal politics rather than party politics.
- The fourth syndrome is ‘patronage machines’ where elite autonomy exceeds accessibility and political opportunities exceed economic ones, as in Indonesia.
- In this syndrome, well-entrenched elites manipulate limited economic rewards to control political competition.
Johnston’s model identifies successful reform strategies associated with each syndrome that may be applied to Southeast Asia. In ‘interest group bidding’ reform must aim to re-establish balance by strengthening official autonomy, protecting state-society boundaries and enhancing internal bureaucratic accountability. Reforms should also include campaign finance laws and lobbying regulations to protect political competition.
- In ‘elite hegemony’ reform campaigns may easily be perverted by the political elite. Genuine reforms must encourage broader political competition and open routine lines of access and accountability to elites.
- This can be achieved by enhancing press and judiciary independence from political elites, encouraging a stronger civil society and more competitive elections.
- Reform in ‘fragmented patronage/extended factionalism’ is difficult to achieve, but must aim to increase elite autonomy and broad based economic growth.
- This can be achieved by enhancing professional standards in law enforcement, the legal and judicial sector, and the consolidation of a few strong political parties.
- In ‘patronage machines’ reform must enhance access to elites and expand economic opportunity.
- This can be achieved by opening up electoral politics, increasing the independence of the civil service and strengthening independent civil society groups.
