‘Power-sharing’ has become a popular concept as a means to reunite divided societies. It has proved successful in ending fighting and establishing national unity in several states of Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America.
This paper, from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, examines the concept of power-sharing and how it is used in conflict resolution. Power-sharing can be effective in countering conflict, ethnic cleansing and genocide. However, there are also problems when implementing this approach. Power- sharing is often not sustainable, particularly given the difficulties faced by conflict-affected states. These difficulties are highlighted in this paper through case studies across Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.
The key findings of the document are:
- A key aspect of power-sharing is its opposition to the principal of majoritarianism (the ‘Westminster ideal’ of single-party rule, government versus opposition, winner-takes-all structure). This majoritarian model inherently implies that one side ‘loses’, and thus, it is argued, increases the scope for conflict.
- Its four basic features are: 1) power-sharing amongst all significant groups; 2) internal autonomy for those groups that want it; 3) proportional representation and proportional allocation of resources; 4) possibility for minority veto on significant matters.
- Power-sharing must be adapted to suit local circumstances. E.g., in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi, a territorial dimension would have to be left out of power-sharing strategies, as this would result in partition.
- Power-sharing has facilitated the peace process in many war-torn countries, including Ethiopia/Eritrea, Uganda, Mozambique, and Bosnia- Herzegovina.
- However, there are also cases where it has not been successful, e.g. Nigeria, Cyprus, Malaysia, Lebanon, Sudan and Cambodia.
A key aspect of power-sharing is the importance placed on institutions and constitutional procedures in stabilising conflict-affected states. This paper questions whether this is a correct assumption and draws a number of policy relevant lessons:
- Institutions created in power- sharing must also feature norms that are common to the major conflict groups. For example, in Rwanda, power-sharing failed because the notion of co-existence was not previously a feature of the groups in conflict.
- Power-sharing arrangements have been shown to be inadequate for maintaining post-conflict stability, characterised by feelings of disenfranchisement amongst ex- combatants, and exacerbated by an environment of acute socio-economic inequalities.
- Governments must be sufficiently competent to maintain institutions of conflict resolution and provide individuals of all ethnicities with basic human needs. However, post-conflict states often lack the ability to provide basic services due to the host of other problems that they face.
- Additionally, cutbacks in public spending which are required by structural adjustment programmes implemented by post-conflict states are not conducive to the provision of basic services.
- Therefore, coping with the multitude of problems facing a conflict-affected state requires going far beyond a simple power-sharing formula towards a more inclusive representative system. An integrated approach to human security – access to food, income, healthcare, and so on – is key
