Why did the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) fail to create conditions for civilian protection? This paper from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) argues that this was largely a result of the failure to secure effective ceasefire arrangements, a prerequisite for the achievement of a political settlement. A potential ceasefire was lost to short-term political expediency that imposed a premature ‘comprehensive’ peace agreement on the parties. Peace agreements require coherent, effective and specific security provisions and transition strategies that link short-term stabilisation with longer-term security sector transformation.
As with many African peace processes, the lack of a security negotiations strategy was central to the failure of the DPA. Given the complexity of the Darfur conflict, the mutual hatred of the warring parties and the scale of suffering, a ceasefire and civilian protection process were essential to enabling negotiations. However, the ceasefire strategy was defeated by ‘deadline diplomacy’ that truncated negotiations and undermined planning, paving the way for the imposition of an externally constructed agreement.
The African Union (AU) mediation team failed to seriously attend to security arrangements throughout most of the Abuja peace talks. Efforts to encourage the discussion of strategic security arrangements, including the application of humanitarian ceasefire principles, were rejected:
- The previous N’Djamena ceasefire agreements were contradictory and unworkable. The lack of an effective implementation strategy created problems for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) regarding their mandate.
- The core problem with the DPA was the attempt to package the entire range of conflict issues into a comprehensive agreement. This included welding together an incomplete ceasefire with an agreement on the final status of the forces.
- The Darfur conflict has escalated since the signing of the DPA. The problems of managing the agreement’s ambitious security dimensions have proven to be as intractable as the direct conflict.
- The ceasefire commission set up after the signing of the DPA collapsed. The attempt to do everything at once resulted in the inability to do anything.
Ceasefire negotiations benefit hugely from basic concepts that help create a framework for progress. Thereafter, specific issues require detailed procedures and processes to be addressed effectively. An incremental approach with an effective ceasefire as a first step, aimed at building confidence, capacity and political space for negotiations could have provided a workable alternative strategy in Darfur. Security issues, with a clear and coherent strategy, should be at the centre of peace negotiations:
- In every conflict the ‘ripe moment’ for negotiations needs to be reached – where conflicting parties conclude that the cost of conflict is unbearable.
- Sustainable peacemaking requires co-operation between the parties to the conflict and meaningful ownership by those parties. Supporting capacity development enhances ownership and enables more effective negotiations.
- Security arrangements in peace processes are divided into three phases: ceasefire and interim arrangements; ceasefire management and transitional security; and agreement on comprehensive final status arrangements. The middle stage is the vital fulcrum between short-term stabilisation and long-term security sector transformation.
- Mediators, envoys and advisors to peace processes must learn about and incorporate security sector transformation techniques.
- Parties must negotiate specific implementation modalities and have a clear understanding of what they have agreed to do, as well as where, when and how.
