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Home»Document Library»Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh

Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh

Library
International Crisis Group
2008

Summary

What progress has the military installed caretaker government (CTG) in Bangladesh made towards holding credible elections? This report from the International Crisis Group examines developments in Bangladesh since the military coup in 2007. It argues that while the military’s desire to reform the political parties and tackle corruption is understandable, the CTG’s measures undermine the country’s democratic institutions.

Installed in January 2007, the CTG in Bangladesh used emergency powers to clamp down on violence and promised to tackle corruption, nepotism and political infighting. However, its achievements have been patchy and relations with the major political parties are acrimonious. Efforts to sideline the two prime ministers of the post-1990 democratic period have faltered and attempts to tackle corruption and reshape democratic politics have stalled. Even if elections are held on schedule, there is no guarantee that reforms will be sustainable. If they are delayed, meanwhile, the risk of confrontation will grow.

The CTG has taken essential preliminary steps towards more extensive political and electoral reform. Its anti-corruption drive has targeted powerful politicians and it has banned debilitating general strikes that sapped business confidence and disrupted daily life. However, there is now fear that the CTG is undermining the democratic institutions it set out to rescue:

  • In its first year in power, the government made around 440,000 arrests ostensibly linked to its anti-corruption drive. This created a climate of fear in the country.
  • Two floods, a cyclone and rising food prices have left many Bangladeshis hungry. The CTG’s poor handling of the economy and natural disasters has aggravated underlying scepticism over its real intentions.
  • Attempts to force former Prime Ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina into exile failed. While both are under detention and facing corruption charges, they continue to dominate their parties.
  • The military has been careful to avoid being front and centre of the CTG. However, there have been persistent signals that the army would like to institutionalise a degree of continuing influence after the elections.

There is an urgent need for all sides to negotiate a peaceful and sustainable return to democracy. Failure to do so would invite confrontation. Recommendations include the following:

  • The CTG and the military should lift the state of emergency at least two months before any elections. They should invite national and international observers to monitor elections. They should carry out a number of further steps ahead of elections.
  • The CTG and the military should disavow the policy of sidelining Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia. They should ensure that the trials of Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia are fair, speedy and transparent.
  • Political parties should promote internal party democracy, reject those convicted in corruption cases as candidates and agree on an election code of conduct. They should not boycott the elections and, if they are deemed free and fair, accept the results.
  • The CTG and political parties should seek to ensure a smooth transition to democracy by entering into a dialogue. They should hold discussions with civil society to forge a national charter for postelection governance and respect for human rights.
  • The international community should maintain pressure on the CTG to hold elections. It should encourage dialogue among the CTG and parties and support election monitoring mechanisms.

Source

International Crisis Group, 2008, 'Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh', Asia Report No. 151, International Crisis Group

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