This paper offers a political explanation to the problem of spatial inequality in developing countries, paying particular attention to the implications of patronage politics and inter-elite power relations for the spatial distribution of public goods. It argues that prospects for overcoming spatial inequalities in the clientelist-driven political environments of developing countries depend substantially on how elites from lagging regions are incorporated into ruling coalitions.
It emphasises the need to understand ‘powerlessness’ of lagging regions as stemming not necessarily from their exclusion from political decision making structures, but also from their incorporation into such structures on terms that potentially underpin their poverty.
The paper notes that, given resource scarcity in developing countries, ethno-regional groups seek access to influential positions in government to present group interests in the decision-making process. In such contexts, comprehensive policies that skew benefits towards the poorest are more likely to be sustainably implemented when elites who directly represent the interests of those segments of the population have substantial influence over resource allocation and broader policy. Strategies to address inter-regional development gaps could therefore consider ways of shifting power relations in favour of poorer regions.
