The theory that state influence alone can trigger genocide is an insufficient explanation of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. This paper, published by the Crisis States Research Centre, reports on a research project that examines the question of why so many ordinary Hutus participated in the genocide. The bottom-up factor of a Hutu mindset of historic grievances against Tutsis was a necessary pre-condition for genocide of this scale and execution to occur.
Rwandan genocide scholarship typically focuses on the role played by elites within State institutions, political and economic forces at the time or some combination of both. Differences between prefectures, communes, sectors and cells of Rwanda’s population and geographical variations have not been properly captured. The genocide is misleadingly conceived of as a homogenous, indivisible event.
This research project examined a combined Tutsi-Hutu population of 4054 in four communities in the North and South. The study also addressed ethnic cohesion of the population, ethnicity of state authorities and political party presence in the target communities.
Study findings indicate a marked difference in state authority, political conditions and levels of ethnic distrust in northern and southern Rwanda in the period preceding the genocide. These findings are:
- Rwandans who participated in the genocide were not simply obeying state orders. They had already internalised a set of historical and ideological beliefs and deeply-held grievances against Tutsis.
- While the genocide was triggered by State sanctioning, its implementation would have been impossible in the absence of these deeply-held beliefs.
- In the North, state authority was undisputed; its anti-Tutsi position was well-established. Political parties opposing the de facto state party were non-existent.
- In the South, state officials expressed different opinions on the threat of Tutsis. State authority was less powerful; it had been under threat since the recent emergence of opposition political parties.
- Ethnic prejudice against the Tutsi was more overt and longstanding in the North, where more Hutus felt aggrieved by perceived Tutsi socio-economic superiority.
- Hutus justified their participation in the genocide because they believed it was an ethnic war that, if lost, would reverse gains of the 1959 Hutu revolution. However, more northern than southern Hutus, by a margin of 85-65 percent, felt their actions were justified.
An interaction of top-down and bottom-up factors must be present to create mass mobilisation for violence. Other conclusions include:
- The statist position that the genocide was organised at the top and simply implemented locally assumes obedience to authority that the study did not find.
- The Hutu were not longstanding racists or chauvinists. Despite Hutu memories of past grievances, the two groups had co-existed more or less peacefully in the South for years preceding the genocide.
- More analysis needs to be conducted in different parts of Rwanda to identify the different means by which the State and population chose genocide.
