Cambodia’s conservative political culture must make way for more dialogue, compromise and mutual gain. How can international peace-building initiatives encourage Cambodia’s democratic transition? This issue of ‘Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives’ compiles various articles reviewing Cambodia’s transition towards democracy after three decades of war and social upheaval.
Following a brief look at Cambodia’s history, the authors focus primarily on the peace process since the 1991 Paris Agreements, with particular regard to the 1993 and 1998 elections. Following years of conflict, largely attributable to external actors, the withdrawal of the UN’s peace-keeping mission (UNTAC) in 1993 left the international community with little influence and ill-prepared for a response to the 1997 coup. Cambodia’s tradition of personalised rule is now set against the international community’s failure to better enforce the development of democratic political institutions.
After 1993, the international community’s greatest shortfall in its peace-building mandate was its failure to protect human rights, inevitably reinforcing the power politics driving such persecution. Following the 1998 elections, some international actors had a greater concern for stability in Cambodia than for democratic government. Other conclusions are that:
- The absence of strong and autonomous political institutions leaves power largely with a small political elite, many of whom disregard constitutional constraints on power and are rarely disciplined by civil society- driven ‘checks and balances’
- A ‘winner-takes-all’ political culture undermines cooperation and dialogue, limits the potential for neutral mediators and provides few incentives for transparency in decision-making or consensus-building
- The lack of popular challenges to Cambodia’s strict patterns of hierarchy and personalised rule, largely driven by patronage, militates against a deepening of political accountability in the near future
- The Association of South East Asian Nations’ diplomatic initiatives have proved weak due to divisions between its members, a lack of political and economic leverage over Cambodia and a tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of either member or non-member states
- The lack of consensus among international actors on peace-building priorities has strengthened Cambodia’s political personalities and frequently protected them from international condemnation
- The effectiveness of international peace-building was reduced by the failure of donor countries to link financial and technical assistance with political changes needed to strengthen the peace and avoid crises, such as the 1997 coup
International peace-building efforts should look beyond personalities and influence the institutions which shape and constrain Cambodia’s leaders. When applying conditions to aid packages donors must consider the short- and long-term effects on stability that may result from any cut in their provision.
Further policy implications include:
- What follows elections is a key test to their success. This requires an international willingness to set clear benchmarks on electoral conduct and an understanding of procedures for dealing with irregularities and the transferring of power
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Peace-building initiatives should be better grounded in the local culture, in particular Khmer Buddhism, which cuts across political divisions and holds a non-violent message which could add constructively to political and social change
- It must be understood that democratic transitions are long-term projects and require recognition and adaptation to cultural and historic realities
- International engagement must be more united and consistent, matching rhetoric to concrete actions and making better use of the range of political tools at their disposal
- The tradition of peace activism is weak in Cambodia and sustained support will be needed if local non-governmental capacities to safeguard peace are to become an important force
- Competing power bases within the state can emerge from power-sharing arrangements, which assume that unresolved struggles for political power and dominance can be managed by constitutional design alone
