Preventing and reducing the unauthorised diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) transfers is widely acknowledged to be a critical issue. The UN Programme of Action (PoA) on SALW includes strong commitments on this matter. This report, by Biting the Bullet, identifies processes by which SALW transfers are diverted to unauthorised recipients, outlines aspects of transfers that pose particular risks, and proposes measures to mitigate such risks. It also specifically considers existing and potential good practice with regard to end-user certificates (EUCs), preventing unauthorised re-export, and controlling transit of SALW.
Virtually all states participate in SALW transfers, as importers, exporters, transit of transhipment states, or because arms brokers or shipment agencies operate within their jurisdiction. Although states may not be primary manufacturers, most are sources of second-hand arms, ammunition or components. Thus it is important to focus on ensuring effective controls in all aspects of SALW transfers.
The processes by which SALW transfers are diverted to unauthorised recipients are complex:
- SALW transfers can be diverted due to loss in transit, inadequate national regulations, poor enforcement practices, or corrupt or neglectful performance by officials in one or more of the states responsible for the transfer.
- Unauthorised agents can also access SALW after they reach their intended recipient due to inadequate security and management on the recipient’s part or the recipient deliberately making transfers to parties not authorised by the original exporting state.
- The main priority for states is to prevent SALW diversion before it takes place by denying transfer authorisation to applications involving particular risks. For example, where the transfer control documentation is forged, where the statement relating to the end-use is misleading, or where brokers may facilitate diversion.
- A number of measures may be applied to mitigate these risks. These include ensuring clear end-user agreements, requiring pre-authorisation of transit routes, and ensuring any brokers involved have good track records.
The report considers existing standards and good practices and potential international mechanisms and procedures that could be usefully established:
- Poor use of EUCs and corrupt end-use practices have facilitated illicit trade in SALW. In order to ensure that EUCs are not false, governments that license the export of SALW need to take steps to allow for the verifications of EUCs provided. Furthermore, where governments consider that the provider of a EUC may then divert SALW to an unauthorised end-user, an export license should not be granted.
- The extent to which exporting states seek to control the re-export of SALW is key to preventing undesirable transfers. Good practice involves accounting for the risk of re-export in the initial risk assessment, carrying out checks to ensure the bona fide nature of the end user, and to incorporate provisions relating to controls on re-export into contracts, licenses and EUCs.
- While in transit, SALW are susceptible to diversion from the intended end-user to an illicit entity. Effective transit controls include laws that allow for the scrutiny of all SALW entering national jurisdiction, securing the consent of transit states prior to authorising export, and the issuing of transit licenses dependent upon the provision of relevant documentation.
