How can spoilers of peace processes be managed? This article from the Journal of International Security argues that choosing an appropriate strategy to manage spoilers requires the correct diagnosis of the type of spoiler. To make an accurate diagnosis, an international actor must overcome ‘organisational blinders’ such as prior commitments to the spoiler. International actors’ success in spoiler management will also depend on factors such as a coordinated strategy and the ability to create an external coalition for peace.
Spoilers are leaders and parties who believe that the peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview and interests. Only the strategies of international actors, as opposed to domestic actors, to manage spoilers are addressed here. International actors confront several different spoiler problems depending on the position of the spoiler, the number of spoilers, the type of spoiler and the locus of the spoiler problem:
- Position: Spoilers can be inside or outside peace processes. Insider spoilers are parties to the peace and tend to use strategies of stealth. Outsider spoilers are not parties to the peace and often use strategies of violence.
- Number: There may be more than one spoiler. Any strategy used to deal with one spoiler has implications for strategies used to manage other spoilers.
- Type: Spoilers differ in their goals and their commitment to achieving these goals. In this way, they can be categorised as either ‘limited’, ‘greedy’ or ‘total’. Limited spoilers have limited goals such as a share of power, total spoilers pursue total power and hold immutable preferences, and greedy spoilers hold goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk.
- Locus: The locus of a spoiler may be it leader or its followers. If the impetus for spoiler behaviour comes from the leader, then the spoiler can alter type if its leader changes. If the impetus comes from the followers, it cannot.
In the 1990s, international custodians of peace processes pursued three major strategies for managing spoilers: inducement, or giving the spoiler what it wants; socialisation, or changing the behaviour of the spoiler to adhere to established norms; and coercion, or punishing spoiler behaviour. International actors’ success depends on factors such as the ability to create an external coalition for peace, their resources and the consensus formed about the legitimacy of spoiler demands and behaviour.
- The threat of withdrawal by international actors is a coercive strategy, but can only work if: the target does view this as a punishment; the custodian can credibly seem indifferent to the ending of the war; and if all parties are ‘limited’ spoilers who want a settlement to succeed and are equally culpable in failing to meet obligations.
- The ‘departing train’ strategy involves external actors agreeing that the peace process will continue without the spoiler and then protecting the parties who are pursuing peace. This strategy is a gamble that parties to the peace process will be strengthened sufficiently to deal with the spoiler on their own once international actors have disengaged, and it can make custodians vulnerable to the demands of those parties who do continue with the peace process.
- Inducement can be used with limited spoilers, and may require clear limits to be set to guard against a continued cycle of grievance and reward.
- The choice of an appropriate strategy requires the correct diagnosis of spoiler type. Total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace agreement. Greedy spoilers can be accommodated if the costs of war are sufficiently high.
- To make an accurate diagnosis, ‘organisational blinders’ must be overcome. These include prior commitments to the spoiler; organisational doctrine which may assume the spoiler’s good faith; and organisational interests.
