What is the purpose of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)? Is it a technocratic exercise in statebuilding and capacity development by outsiders, or should it be seen as a political project to promote regional stability and dialogue? This Third World Quarterly paper critically examines the nature of RAMSI by focusing on the ways in which political power is (re)produced. Providing a detailed background of the project and why it has been seen as model for statebuilding, the article then critically analyses RAMSI as a political project for state transformation. The conclusion is that state transformation in the Solomon Islands is limited.
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was launched in July 2003 at the request of the then Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Sir Allan Kemakeza. Following five years of instability in the region, the Australian government finally decided to take on the project and deal with existing tensions.
RAMSI was established as a three-step process. The first priority was the immediate stabilisation of the law and order situation through an overwhelming display of force. Second, government finances were stabilised and a national budget prepared. Finally, statebuilding and capacity development was targetted. This last stage is ongoing.
Discussions over RAMSI commonly attempt to evaluate whether it has been successful or not at its stated aim of building the capacity of the Solomon Islands state. Yet to understand what it is that RAMSI’s programs do, it is more useful to view it as a form of state transformation. State transformation refers to the ways in which RAMSI affects the production and reproduction of political power in Solomon Islands. For this reason, RAMSI cannot simply be judged as transforming the state from the outside, but as a political project that aims to transform state-society relations through the establishing of forms of multilevel governance that can be consolidated at the level of the state apparatus. State transformation in the Solomon Islands is put in practice on two levels:
- At the diplomatic level: Mechanisms are implemented in order to conform RAMSI’s work to the aims and policies of the Solomon Islands government. Furthermore, parliamentary reviews are undertaken by the government to reflect political support for RAMSI.
- At the level of the different programmes: RAMSI’s multilevel existence, simultaneously inside and outside the target state, is a fundamental feature of contemporary statebuilding interventions.
RAMSI’s structure and mandate were developed with the aim of achieving long-term stability in the Solomon Islands. Yet five years after its deployment, RAMSI still continues to divide people’s opinion both nationally and abroad. However, following the analytical discussion provided in the article, the author calls for RAMSI to be examined as politically driven regime of state transformation in an emergency context rather than characterising it as integral to statebuilding and a recipe for governance. It is precisely the structure of RAMSI which limit state-transformation in the Solomon Islands. Some of these limitations include:
- Hegemony of neoliberal notions upheld by RAMSI has meant that challenges to neoliberalism are seen as threatening to both political stability and the prospect of market-led economic recovery. Hence, they are security risks to be contained.
- The main avenue of wealth and power accumulation for indigenous Solomon Islanders had been the state apparatus, but to sustain their power they had to cultivate patronage networks, both within the state apparatus and at the local level.
- The absence of meaningful ideological or programmatic cleavages has meant that money politics remains crucial to the formation of political coalitions in Solomon Islands.