Why is the cabinet system used to produce consistent policy making? What makes decisions made in a cabinet system binding? How is the cabinet system used in modern governments? Governments are increasingly using cabinets or cabinet-like structures. This has been linked to pressure to use collective decision making in the policy process and increased pressure on heads of government to heed advice from ministerial colleagues.
This World Bank article examines the cabinet system as a means of ensuring consistent policy making. It defines cabinets and cabinet-like governments and the roles of cabinet and cabinet committee meetings. It also identifies the ways in which a cabinet system can address the common set of risks faced by governments.
Recent trends across forms of governments show an increase in the use of cabinet and cabinet-like governments as a means of building consensus. Cabinet systems and processes vary widely between countries, although the basis for their success remains common. Cabinets provide strong incentives for politicians to stand behind decisions made in cabinet. These reasons include the potential for budgetary trade-offs, and individual politician’s prestige and public standing.
Other important findings include:
- Cabinets are binding on ministers as the costs of leaving are greater than the benefits, although the threat of resignation remains credible and the threat of expulsion remains real, although rare
- Collective cabinets reduce the likelihood of significant amendments to government budgets by legislatures and the threat of dismissal between elections
- While cabinet structure and convention vary between countries, there is consistency in minister characteristics, such as unwillingness to resign and bureaucratic experience
- Countries that are not legislative democracies can still benefit from using a cabinet or cabinet-like system
- Cabinet decision making is at the intersection of civil service and public expenditure reform and is, therefore, key.
Recent World Bank-supported public sector reform projects include institutional support for cabinet as core. This article cites examples from Gambia, Malawi, Lithuania and Ukraine, while also making reference to public sector reform in Tanzania, Zambia and Albania. Emerging research findings show that when public officials believe policy is unlikely to be overturned they are more likely to share their manager’s views and goals and believe management regulations will be enforced. Thus, the key policy priorities are:
- Providing institutional support for cabinets as a way of increasing government ownership of wider institutional reform programmes and supporting public expenditure management reform
- Supporting stable cabinet systems in order to encourage consistent policy making and increasing confidence in government
- Strengthening cabinet committees and the cabinet office in order to free a cabinet to concentrate on strategic decision making, rather than spending time on routine decision making. This makes the cabinet system more effective.
