Somalia is one of the most dangerous environments in the world for aid workers and humanitarian organisations. One of the largest obstacles to reaching people in need of humanitarian assistance is the militant armed group Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab’s sophisticated system for monitoring and controlling aid, the demands placed on aid agencies and the consequences of failed negotiations are revealed in this research.
Drawn from over 80 interviews with former Al-Shabaab officials, aid workers and civilians, this research details difficulties faced by aid agencies attempting to operate in Al-Shabaab controlled areas during the 2011 famine. Al-Shabaab’s Humanitarian Coordination Office forced aid agencies to complete registration forms and other documentation that laid out general conditions for access, with negotiations with the militant group also resulting in payments of registration fees (as much as $10,000). The consequences for breaking the rules were extreme: outright hostility, expulsions, attacks and harassment.
The majority of the research focuses on events in 2011, but highlights Al-Shabaab’s ongoing methods of control and regulation in areas under the group’s control; far from having disappeared, the group remains present in large parts of the country, continuing to pose a tremendous obstacle to humanitarian action.
The study found that:
- In south-central Somalia, aid agencies were placed in an impossible situation, facing demands from all sides that threatened their integrity and ability to help those in dire need of assistance. The choices that agencies were forced to make provided few ‘right’ options, particularly during the famine. However, some tactics and approaches did enable aid agencies to access Al- Shabaab areas, at least for a time, in a more principled manner and provide critical assistance to civilians living under the group’s control. Despite pervasive attempts to divert or co-opt aid, aid agencies did not simply give in to Al-Shabaab’s demands. Those agencies that succeeded in remaining in areas under Al-Shabaab’s control, and which appeared to avoid paying fees or ceding control of their programming, pursued rigorous, structured engagement with the group at all levels, from the senior leadership shura to ground-level fighters. They allocated significant resources and time to understanding the group, developing relationships and pursuing dialogue. Indeed, comprehensive dialogue with Al-Shabaab at all levels appeared to be the single most important action aid agencies could take to reduce the risk of diversion and improve the prospects for long-term access to areas under its control. Such agencies, perhaps because of the internal communication and structured engagement that was pursued, were more effectively able to communicate consistent messages and adhere to the ‘red lines’ beyond which compromise was not viable.
- In order to work effectively in areas under Al-Shabaab control, the best prospects appear to lie in significant investment of time and resources to develop a structured strategy for engagement, staff training and support and building relationships and cultivating dialogue with all parties to the conflict. Other agencies appeared to accept difficult constraints and compromises in order to reach civilians in need of lifesaving assistance, particularly during the famine. Where such compromises resulted in the payment of registration fees or the monitoring of programmes, it is clear that many agencies saw this as necessary in order to prevent people from starving to death and to provide access to lifesaving medical care. But such compromises were problematic. In some instances they resulted in new dangers, most notably the significant transfer of risk to national staff. This is particularly true where such negotiations were undertaken in an ad hoc manner by local staff and where aid agencies had no structured strategy for engagement at all levels.
- Some simply found the cost of doing business with Al-Shabaab intolerable, and withdrew from areas under its control; others were attacked and banned by the group, leaving them little choice but to discontinue work. The reasons why many aid agencies simply chose not to, or were unable to, engage in a structured or deliberate way with Al-Shabaab are understandable. Aid agencies operating in Somalia are forced to contend with political pressure applied by donors and compelled to deal with complex and confusing legal restrictions regarding engagement with Al-Shabaab. The politicisation of assistance by donor governments was ultimately self-defeating. Counterterror restrictions appear to have increased bureaucracy more than genuine oversight. Alienating Al-Shabaab left little leverage for diplomats or donors to draw upon when seeking to engage it on humanitarian concerns. The restrictions also inflicted further damage on the image of aid agencies among local populations and armed groups, already suspicious of their motivations and allegiances, hindering their ability to work safely and effectively.
Above all, greater information-sharing and collaboration among aid agencies in addressing the factors that limited access, including counter-terrorism restrictions, would have been more effective than the often disconnected and ad hoc efforts that were ultimately made. The Somali government could have played a vital role in helping the humanitarian community navigate the complex environment as the worst part of the famine was unfolding. The lack of national policies in this area has only compounded the problem.
