What do the Burundi peace negotiations reveal about the neo-liberal conception of peace that informs conflict resolution in Africa? Using the Burundi peace negotiations as an example, this article from the Review of African Political Economy examines neo-liberal conflict resolution in Africa. Peace negotiations should be seen as political struggles, beyond that between the belligerents, due to the involvement of supporting actors promoting vested interests. Resulting peace agreements are not necessarily consensual or compromises for the sake of peace, but rather temporary stalemates between international, regional and local actors.
The Burundi peace process represents a struggle between different visions of peace. Western donors supported a neo-liberal peace, which left the existing social system intact and was not conditional on cessation of direct violence. Regional actors sought to establish a new mode of politics in Africa. Unable to incorporate the perspectives of civil society and lacking international support and financial resources, however, regional actors accepted the imposition of a ‘liberal peace’. The Burundi peace negotiations reveal neo-liberal peace-making to be a contested terrain in which long-term cessation of hostilities may not be top of the agenda.
Neo-liberal peace-making has resulted in the inclusion of non-state actors, proliferation of mediators and power-sharing between belligerents. It has also led to the privileging of violence as a mechanism for political inclusion and de-politicisation of warfare. Examination of the procedures and actors during the Burundi negotiations highlights the inconclusiveness and inherent limitations of neo-liberal conflict resolution:
- Special envoys from outside the region held alternative peace talks to undermine the Tanzanian peace initiative. These talks led to an intensification of violence and gave legitimacy to the Burundian regime’s refusal to accept regional mediation.
- All political parties were invited to the negotiations. Many parties, however, lacked a recognised constituency. Giving all parties equal status led to a proliferation of parties and may have contributed to factionalism within rebel movements.
- Civil society groups were only asked to participate in negotiations as part of political party delegations. This reinforced the idea that peace-making was the preserve of political parties and rebel movements, not the collective responsibility of the people.
- The peace agreement did not bring about a ceasefire, allowing rebel movements to continue to fight until they achieved an agreement that benefitted them. This reinforced the notion that political power could be won through violence.
The regional initiative for peace in Burundi marked a significant step to the ending of genocidal violence and human rights abuses in Africa. A number of lessons can be learned from the Burundi peace negotiations:
- The potential exists for a major commitment by regional leaders to end protracted conflicts in Africa, especially those that are genocidal and regionally destabilising.
- With collective leadership, African leaders have the capacity to promote a new mode of politics that rejects coups and the overthrow of democratic governments. This capacity can be mobilised and supported largely by African professionals.
- Creating spaces of peace requires a more radical transformation of the state than that envisioned in contemporary approaches to power-sharing and reconstruction programmes.
- It is not sufficient to ensure that peace remains on the agenda. A long-term, inclusive perspective on peace must be articulated that gives agency to a multiple-voiced political community and opposes all forms of violence.
