The last two decades have seen a strong emphasis on reducing the role of government and reforming traditional public sector bureaucracies by adopting aspects of private sector principles and practices. How much sense do these new public management reform models conceived in developed countries make in developing world contexts? This is the final volume of a series on service delivery reform in developing countries from a research consortium coordinated by the University of Birmingham. It draws together the reform experiences of African, Asian and Latin American countries across four service sectors.
The focus of public management reform is organisational restructuring, increasing use of market-type mechanisms and increasing emphasis on performance. In developed countries these reforms were driven by ideological commitment and rising public expectations. In developing countries they were driven by external pressures in the context of financial crisis and indebtedness. Organisational and institutional reform in developing countries is proving more complex, challenging and protracted than reformers thought. A more cautious and incremental approach to reform with a sequencing that allows for capacity development is required.
In the countries studied, reform design was often ambitious and implementation was frequently weak. The capacity to perform new roles differs according to country context and sector. In general, poorer states are weaker and experience greater difficulties in reform implementation. The case studies also revealed:
- Donors and international financial institutions were often at the centre of reform initiatives in partnership with senior officials from core ministries. These partnerships complicate reform as government officials act both as allies and objects of change.
- There was little public engagement with reform. Where public engagement was evident, pressure was generally to defend existing rights and privileges against reforms.
- In general, managerial autonomy, clear policy guidelines and exposure to competition improved the performance of reforms.
- User charging can promote equity but only where consumption is measurable, the service is optional and the poor can be exempted effectively. Health service charging usually has inequitable effects.
- Contracting can deliver efficiency gains if contracts are clearly specified and monitored. This is difficult in states with weak administrative capacity. Shorter contracts present fewer obstacles, but lesser advantages.
Reformers have usually sought to adjust the role of the state without recognising the need for increased government capacity to make the reform process work. New government roles (such as contracting, regulating and assessing performance) are more complex and require more long-term capacity development than traditional direct service provision roles. Policy implications are that:
- Context really does matter in designing and managing reforms.
- Incremental and carefully sequenced reforms related to existing conditions may be more successful than comprehensive approaches that overstretch capacity to implement reforms.
- Given weak capacities it is advisable to start reform with simple activities that strengthen accountability and performance before governments take on new roles such as regulation.
- Reformers must distinguish between transitional capacity difficulties that require short-term interventions and fundamental problems that require longer investment, and act accordingly.
- Long-term reforms must focus on the deeper institutional as well as the organisational aspects of capacity change. Institutional factors include the stability of the political economy and the independence of the judiciary.
