The current conservatism in the Philippines’ strategic affairs reflects the influence of an entrenched political elite, which negatively affects the country’s defence affairs. This paper, published by the Journal of Security Sector Management, analyses the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernisation programmme and how excessive civilian control can hamper military reform. Because of psychological dysfunction, miscalculations or inappropriate strategic beliefs, the political elite may pursue either overly cooperative or overly conflicting reform policies that can jeopardise the state’s primary security interests.
Since the Philippines achieved independence in 1946, approximately 400 families have dominated the country’s politics and government. This elite finances politicians and political parties, purchases the loyalty of bureaucrats and the military, and influences defence affairs through control of the Philippine Congress.
During his 1972-1986 authoritarian rule, President Ferdinand Marcos used the military as a primary means to exercise his political power. However, given the gradual diminution of military support by the United States (US), his government began to recognise the need to develop AFP capabilities and enhance its external defence function. In 1995, the Philippine Congress passed legislation to modernise the AFP and, inter alia, develop an external defence capability.
The AFP’s adoption of an external defence role has been materially influenced by the political elite’s fear of agrarian radicalism, its scant interest in military institutions and continued reliance upon the US to support the country’s national defence. The following iteration of the AFP modernisation process indicates the degree to which the political elite and Philippine Congress have hampered military reform:
- Despite expectations that the AFP would perform more external defence functions after US force withdrawal in the 1990s, the AFP has continued to perform internal counter-insurgency functions.
- Despite periodic attempts by the executive to push modernisation, since the passage of enabling legislation over ten years ago, Congress has not authorised spending on modernisation.
- A 2003 mutiny by AFP officers highlighted military frustration with lack of reform; subsequent recognition of military discontent has not resulted in reform funding or discernible implementation.
- The events of September 2001 have revitalised US-Filipino security relations. In exchange for Filipino support for US terrorist responses, a Joint Defence Assessment (JDA) obligates the Philippines to implement military reforms and adopt an integrated defence budget process. However, it remains to be seen if these JDA recommendations are acted upon, overlooked or ignored.
The political elite of the Philippines has focused its attention on accumulating resources and patronage – two crucial components of their control over local and national politics. Any meaningful reform in the Philippine military will have to take into account the skill and shrewdness of this relatively small group, which has effectively blocked military modernisation for decades. Such reform will have to address the following elite attitudes and positions of power:
- Emphasis upon internal security and reliance upon the US regarding external security concerns;
- Control of the legislature; and
- Efforts to make the armed services subservient to its whims at the expense of military professionalism.
