What are the problems of state-reconstruction in war-torn societies? This paper from the Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, examines the role of international actors in the hugely ambitious project of rebuilding states after war.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, political stabilisation of the developing world has become a security issue for Western Countries. Donors are now adopting more interventionist policies towards state reconstruction. War is endemic in the developing world. The roots of many conflicts go back decades, and there is a tendency for them to re-ignite or perpetuate themselves over the long term.
‘New’ wars are more destructive to development and result in more civilian casualties than previous Cold War conflicts. State collapse leads to a governance void, ‘the rule of unlaw’, and ‘societies of fear’. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the state or build peace. The traditional linear model of conflict progression as pre-, during, and post-conflict, with attendant progression from relief to reconstruction and development, is too simplistic. In reality, conflicts are more complex:
- The role of the state varies enormously. Conflicts can be in response to repressive regimes (Sudan), democratic governments that exclude minorities (Sri Lanka), or be regional violence that infects ‘good’ governments (Caucasus, African Great Lakes).
- Governance breakdown can be a result of conflict (DRC), or a cause of conflict (Somalia).
- Most conflicts do not ‘end’. The political, social, and economic factors sustaining them remain. Violence often continues after ceasefire in the form of crime.
Governance failings contribute to violence. War, and its legacies, creates new political realities. Reconstruction cannot therefore be a reconstitution of the state in its pre-conflict form. Donors need to engage with different layers of political authority above and below the state as well as rebuild central government. All forms of intervention need continual interrogation of underlying moral and political principles. The international community must also learn from previous errors. Furthermore:
- Multilateral interventions are less likely to serve special interests than unilateral ones, and are more likely to be perceived as legitimate.
- If unilateral interventions are undertaken, they must be defensible on general principles, and enjoy the consent of national stakeholders.
- Peace agreements, reconstruction plans and constitutions need to emerge from national stakeholders, not imposed by external actors. Peacemakers impose plans surprisingly often.
- There needs to be a better understanding of the trajectories, causes and impacts of conflict, and an awareness of how they might re-ignite.
- It is very difficult to devise broadly applicable good practice models. Rather, there tend to be difficult choices to be made between potentially conflicting goals. For example, security first versus popular consent and electoral legitimacy.
- Further choices include development and global justice versus global security concerns or power sharing versus an effective developmental state.
- Such choices are as much political as technical options, and have to be negotiated in each particular national context.
