Where do warlord regimes emerge from, what are their actions and the impact of their existence on politics? What is the general nature of warlord politics? This article offers an initial framework for future theory of warlord politics using a simple game-theoretic approach. Through case-studies and empirical research, clear explanations as to the strategic decision of warlords are offered. These decisions affect their actions and their opportunities to form coalitions.
In a game, the goal is to win. In traditional politics, the actors are commonly the states. Within a set of rules which guides the game and sanction breaking them, the result is an optimal situation for individuals as well as society. Warlord politics on the contrary is guided by no rules where the cost of deviance has been erased leaving place to a contest of power between key individuals. The outcome is optimal for the winners but suboptimal for society.
The authors define a warlord as an autocratic authority based on a local monopoly of violence that has achieved the positive sovereignty of coercive control of a state without the negative sovereignty of international recognition. An explanation of warlord politics is a matrix game for considering the nature of warlord politics and the dynamics of warlord competition in a structured manner. This matrix consists of a two-by-two structure of which the properties are:
- There are two players who represent competing elites.
- Each player has two alternative strategies or courses of action. Each can choose to either ‘yield’ to or ‘challenge’ his competitor for control.
- We assume initially that each player has a single move, he moves simultaneously, and each has complete information on his competitor’s payoff structure.
- The outcome of the game, defined by the payoffs each player receives, is decided by the strategies chosen by both players, who choose the course of action that will yield the highest return given the anticipated action of their competitor.
The game theory outlines three possible outcomes of the warlord game. Further outcomes are possible if the players have more two or more rivals, the result of which is the creation of coalitions between warlords. Although antithetical to the winner-take-all character of warlord politics, the formation of coalitions is common in warlord politics. The goal of each warlord is to dominate, be the “leader” over the other rivals who are “the followers”, while each maintaining control of their patch. The three main possible outcomes of the warlord game are:
- One player is strong, the other is weak
- Both players are weak
- Both players are strong resulting in a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Every warlord coalition can develop around the minimum number of players needed to dominate the remaining competitors in the game. Each patch of control may vary in size depending on the gains and losses of each warlord. The authors depict a natural trend for weaker players to fuse together against stronger players. Finally, it concludes that there is a common tendency for the number of ‘sides’ playing the game to diminish over time as coalitions of players form to dominate their competitors.
