How has the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) helped promote peace, security and stability on the African continent? This article provides an overview of the origin of the PSC, and discusses elements of its design and mandate. Does the PSC have the resources and credibility to influence the continent’s governments? Without significant additional funding and manpower from the AU, the PSC cannot cope with the huge security problems facing Africa.
The PSC grew out of a process to reform a previous conflict prevention instrument established by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) during the 1990s. Initially apportioning responsibility for peacekeeping to the UN, the OAU suffered from insufficiently clear working procedures, poor attendance, weak chairmanship, lack of data and little action resulting from decisions made. As the OAU slowly lost credibility, the UN’s reluctance to take the lead in resolving African conflicts ushered in the development of the PSC: a ‘smaller committee of big minds’.
The council comprised fifteen member states, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. After five years of operation the PSC had imposed sanctions against regimes in several African states, including Togo, Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar, and authorised peace operations in Sudan, the Comoros and Somalia.
How significant and effective is the PSC, and is this institution best placed to deal with Africa’s security problems?
- There is evident interest in participation in the PSC’s deliberations: twenty-nine of fifty-three AU members have now served on the PSC, and non-members (particularly African governments who are subjects of PSC activities, the UN, EU, and sub-regional entities) are keen to be involved in influencing decisions. However, many PSC members do not invest sufficiently in delegate resources.
- PSC reports undergo rigorous scrutiny and redrafting, indicative of their significance to the members of the council and their audience within the AU and the wider international community.
- In the medium- to long-term the PSC has the potential to become an important institutional environment for socialisation among African governments, influencing attitudes and responses through official statements and peace operations.
- Despite general support for the PSC’s progressive stated objectives, member states have not provided adequate human and financial resources to fulfil them.
- After a poor start, the PSC has designed and partially implemented appropriate working methods for efficient and productive operations. Lack of resources has significantly hampered progress and organisational learning, but a more consistent approach to conflict situations is developing.
- The PSC does not act alone in providing peace and security for the continent, but should be taking a leading role. In large-scale peace operations it is under-equipped to lead and would have to provide political support and legitimacy to the UN. In smaller matters, such as unconstitutional changes of government, the PSC occupies a strong position to respond.
Despite obvious problems, the PSC has made a real difference to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, and can provide a crucial forum for socialisation within African international society.
- In order to cope with the huge security problems in Africa there must be an increase to the PSC’s severely undersized budget and scant staff.
- The PSC must develop a stronger relationship with the UN Security Council, the G8, the EU, and other sources of external funding.
- Institutional design must be strengthened, particularly in respect to addressing the non-military dimensions of security (such as environmental degradation and disease), and the relationship between military and non-military elements.
- PSC personnel must continue to implement working procedures to increase operational efficiency and consistency.
