What is the state of the security sector in Afghanistan? Have recent reforms been successful? This article presents an overview of the Afghan National Army and police, the courts and judiciary, prisons and security intelligence elements. It argues that uneven distribution of international funding means uneven reform. International reform and Western security models are useful but limited; changes of culture, values and behaviour can be made only from within. Situating Afghanistan in the historical, cultural and religious context of South Asia and drawing on South Asian reform models might be more effective.
Security sector reform and governance have been a focus for the Afghan government, the international community and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). However, progress has been slow and fraught with problems. Afghan security organisations still tend to act with impunity. The reforms have emphasised structure, training, equipment and facilities but have done less to promote adherence to the rule of law. Another intensive reform effort will be required to change attitudes and behaviour and pursue reform to its conclusion.
The Afghan security sector is still in a state of flux and is far from being governed effectively. There are too few security governance mechanisms and those that do exist are not yet fully effective. Funding has not been evenly distributed. Given the integrated nature of security and justice, depriving one component of the system may adversely affect the whole sector. Further:
- Few units of the Afghan National Army are capable of independent operations, and the army relies on international air and artillery support.
- There has been failure to recognise the complex and multi-tasked nature of the police and problems of illiteracy and corruption. The roles of the military and police have not been properly differentiated.
- Funding for justice and prisons has not been as forthcoming as for the military or police. There are insufficient funds to bring the prison system into line with international standards.
- With little hope of recourse from state courts, ordinary people turn to the traditional courts and councils of elders for resolution of their legal problems.
The objectives of ANDS are so ambitious and complex that failure to meet them within the timeframe is almost certain. The strategy appears designed to meet Western notions of democracy and security, undervaluing indigenous institutions and practices. International reform and Western security models can bring about ‘hardware’ changes, but changes of culture, values and behaviour can be made only from within.
- Security organisations can become more transparent and accountable with the development of external and civil society institutions. Reform of human resource management in the sector is also needed to change attitudes and behaviour.
- Reform could build on existing Afghan social institutions that have proved their worth. With some oversight and accountability, local shuras could continue to dispense justice and elders could be associated with prisons or provide advice to the police services on community needs. The security sector and tribal communities could work together to find ways to reduce and penalise violent behaviour.
- Mechanisms for intra-regional communication could help reintegrate Afghanistan into South Asia. These could include meetings of ministers and senior officials of security organisations; regional professional associations; and exchanges of personnel. They could also help Afghan security sector reform to acquire an indigenous and South Asian character, and thus greater legitimacy.
