Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) find their origin in the “Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells” that the U.S. military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom established in early 2002. A dozen Army Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers staffed these small outposts, dubbed “Chiclets,” with the task to assess humanitarian needs, implement small-scale reconstruction projects, and establish relations with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and nongovernmental organizations already in the field. To augment the CA effort, by late 2002 the United States expanded this program with the creation of the first PRTs, which added a robust force protection component and representatives of U.S. government civilian agencies.
This report focuses on lessons learned by Americans working in U.S. PRTs. It highlights areas where U.S. capacity and methods of operation required adjustment, or failed to achieve desired objectives.
Key findings:
- Among the three objectives of the PRT program (governance, security, and reconstruction), U.S. commanders viewed promoting the authority of the central government as the primary mission. In most cases, this translated directly into a policy of supporting the provincial governor and the provincial police chief. In many cases, however, PRT support for local leaders was counterproductive. A number of provincial governors and police officials were old-line warlords, militia commanders, or regional power brokers whose loyalties were questionable and whose interests were divergent from those of the central government. Support from PRTs enabled these leaders to further distance themselves from relying on the central government.
- Security role assigned to PRTs was limited to providing for their own protection, providing a security presence, and assisting Afghan forces. PRTs were not responsible for protecting Afghans, UNAMA or representatives of international relief organizations. As military units operating in a non-permissive environment, PRTs used quickly built village improvement projects to demonstrate goodwill and encourage a favourable reaction to their presence. This involvement in development brought criticism from relief agencies that claimed it put them at risk by blurring the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers. NGO representatives also argued that soldiers were not experts in development and that CA projects often reflected a lack of expertise. PRT development projects often competed or conflicted with NGO projects, undermining relationships developed with Afghan communities.
Lessons learned
- In the view of many PRT veterans, the entire multinational PRT program would benefit from an agreed concept of operations and an effective central coordinating authority. The U.S. PRTs would profit from interagency delimitation of civilian and military roles and improved civilian agency staffing, funding, and administrative support. PRT veterans believe the addition of USAID representatives and better coordination with Afghan national development plans improved U.S. PRT reconstruction efforts. Rapidly disbursing long-term funding sources available to civilian representatives would rationalize and speed reconstruction efforts, which should focus on security-related infrastructure. PRT veterans also argue that PRTs are primarily military organizations; thus, better suited for performing security-related tasks. PRTs should concentrate on supporting Afghan security sector reform and providing a security presence in contested areas.
Recommendations:
- The Combined Forces Command, ISAF, and the Afghan government need to develop a central coordinating mechanism and a set of guidelines for managing the PRT program. The State Department should prioritize assignments and provide adequate training for those who serve in Afghanistan. The USDA and other civilian agencies should fund and assign representatives. The CFC, ISAF, and the Afghan government should determine measures of effectiveness. The State Department should develop a program of public diplomacy for State representatives in PRTs. PRT military capabilities should be matched with a robust component of specially trained, adequately resourced, and logistically supported civilian representatives. Congress should pass legislation rationalizing the funding sources available to military and civilian personnel in stability operations.
