What steps has the government of Colombia taken to demobilise right-wing paramilitaries and individual fighters and reintegrate them into society? What are the problems and risks involved in Colombia’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process? This paper from the Bonn International Center for Conversion examines the DDR process in Colombia. While DDR could have a significant positive impact on the conflict in Colombia, failure is still possible and could have significant negative repercussions.
Successful demobilisation of Colombia’s paramilitaries could help to re-establish government control over war-torn regions. If DDR helps to provide security, the state will have the chance to re-establish its essential functions and institutions, promoting economic improvement in these regions. Successful DDR of the paramilitaries could also encourage the left-wing guerrilla movement to demobilise. DDR is taking place while conflict continues, however, running the risk that demobilised combatants may take up arms and rejoin active groups. To prevent this from happening, the government must provide security for civilians and ex-combatants in the demobilised regions.
Colombia’s DDR process faces a number of problems and risks:
- The collective demobilisation process lacks an adequate legal framework, resulting in uncertainty and scepticism. It is feared that paramilitaries could achieve impunity, despite responsibility for massacres and human rights violations.
- Lack of knowledge about the number of combatants to be demobilised hampers planning. It also enables abuse of the system through individuals joining paramilitary groups with the sole purpose of receiving DDR benefits.
- The reintegration programme is decentralised, despite the lack of appropriate communication networks and regional capacities and financing. In addition, reintegration training is not suited to the needs of ex-combatants.
- Demobilisation could simply lead to a change in leadership of paramilitary units. Existing structures may simply be renamed or transformed into organised criminal groups. Demobilisation could even make such groups more flexible and efficient.
- Individual demobilisation lacks attention and support. The government perceives it as a war tactic, creating a number of risks with regard to the appropriate treatment of combatants participating in demobilisation.
The Colombian government must create an adequate legal framework for demobilisation, defining eligibility criteria, procedure and the scope of reintegration measures. The framework must guarantee the prosecution of serious crimes. It should establish a single coordination and decision-making body to manage the different organisations implementing DDR. Further recommendations to promote effective DDR in Colombia include the following:
- The situation of victims must be included in the design of reintegration and reconciliation programmes. Negotiations should involve not just insurgents, but other war-affected groups.
- Solid funding and continued assistance to ex-combatants who have finished reintegration programmes are essential. Reintegration must focus on the requirements of ex-combatants and the receiving society.
- Militarisation of civil society and infiltration of the military or private security sector by former combatants must be avoided. Paramilitary structures must be dismantled. DDR should be accompanied by weapons collection for civil society at large.
- Sensitisation to the needs of vulnerable groups must be included in DDR. Special DDR programmes must be launched for women and the disabled.
- Donors should be incorporated more into the planning and execution of DDR.
- Regular monitoring and evaluation should be carried out to reduce errors and prepare for possible demobilisation of the guerrillas.
