Studies have suggested that the UN has limited state-building capacity and, as of 2008, no agreed framework of security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict environments. This chapter addresses these concerns in the context of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It argues that, while the UN has stabilized the territory, it has been less successful in developing indigenous/national justice and security services. On this basis, the chapter presents recommendations on approaches the UN should employ to support SSR in post-conflict scenarios.
The 1974 Yugoslav constitution declared Kosovo an autonomous province within Serbia. Under Slobodan Milosevic, ethnic tensions between Serb and Albanian Kosovars worsened, and, in 1990, the province’s autonomy was repealed. Violent strife followed and erupted into civil war in 1998-1999. NATO intervened, and the UN Security Council established UNMIK to serve as an interim administration for the territory. The relationship between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority remains extremely delicate and the overall security situation remains problematic.
The UN, in cooperation with its partners (NATO, OSCE, EU), stabilised the justice and security situation in the territory of Kosovo, which is the first stage of most peace operations. Albeit fragile, the UN succeeded in restoring basic justice, safety and security to Kosovo. The UN also laid down the essential institutional parameters upon which justice and security could be delivered by Kosovar actors.
The second phase of peace operations should involve the development of indigenous/national justice and security service delivery. In this regard, the UN has been less successful.
- The extent to which development has occurred, within the Kosovo judiciary for instance, is due primarily to the fact that those activities have been outsourced or were not conducted directly by UN-family staff.
- Where gaps exist in Kosovo’s criminal justice continuum, such as the failure to support Kosovo’s prosecutorial service or establish a judicial police, this can be attributed to the UN’s inability to effectively and efficiently manage its activities, personnel, and resources.
- One of the keys to successful development is the establishment of reliable and measurable performance indicators and the UN-family has been systematically unable to develop methods of evaluating the performance of state agencies it has created.
- Furthermore, it appears that the UN did not support local ownership as an outcome of its SSR initiatives, but rather the experience was more akin to colonial imposition.
In order for the UN to be able to deliver productive and effective SSR programming, the following recommendations should be followed:
- Comparable teams of SSR personnel within the offices of the SRSG and USG/DPKO should be established to plan and manage justice development support initiatives.
- SSR activities in peace operations should be conducted on a project basis rather than as they are currently undertaken.
- The Kosovo experience indicates that if the UN cannot reform its SSR operations, managerial practices, and organisational culture, it is unlikely that the UN will be able to support effective and efficient SSR programmes in future post-conflict scenarios. Under such circumstances, it is recommended that the UN endeavour to outsource to the extent possible its security and justice development programming.
