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Home»Document Library»Voting Intentions in Africa: Ethnic, Economic or Partisan?

Voting Intentions in Africa: Ethnic, Economic or Partisan?

Library
Michael Bratton, Ravi Bhavnani, Tse-Hsin Chen
2011

Summary

This study finds that economic interests play a larger role in people’s voting intentions in African elections than previously recognised. More would-be voters in Africa consider policy performance, especially the government’s perceived handling of unemployment, inflation, and income distribution, than they do ethnic considerations. In addition, people tend to vote for established ruling parties because they expect them to win: they wish to gain access to patronage benefits and to avoid retribution after the election. These dynamics are most evident in countries where dominant parties restrict electoral choice.

Voting motivations are complex in the multi-ethnic, new democracies of Africa and the literature on voting behaviour is accordingly divided. Despite the stereotype of ethnic voting, many African presidents come from ethnic minorities. But contrary to theories of economic voting, incumbent governments are often re-elected despite poor economic performance.

This study evaluates voting theories using individual and country level surveys from 16 African countries in 2005. It also looks at the influence of strategic rather than sincere ‘partisan identification’ (a voter’s underlying allegiance to one political party). It finds that economic interests have twice the impact of ethnic identity:

  • Assessment of actual government performance in macroeconomic policy management is the main economic influence on intended vote choice. This includes performance against job creation, addressing inflation and addressing income inequality.
  • Voter expectations about the future health of the general economy outweigh concerns about personal living standards.
  • Being a member of the ethnic group in power is a strong factor explaining a vote for the ruling party. Conversely, an intention to vote for the opposition is driven mainly by a sense of collective ethnic discrimination. Inter-ethnic distrust has negligible influence.
  • Ethnic fragmentation and political polarisation among rival ethnic groups were not found to have a significant impact on voting intentions.(Higher ethnic fragmentation is associated with votes for the ruling party, while polarisation prompts more opposition voting.) Some 40 per cent of survey respondents claimed to value national identity above ethnic identity.
  • In dominant party systems with weak oppositions, voters have a strong incentive to openly declare loyalty to incumbents in the hope of material rewards. Other voters state an intention to vote for the ruling party – and may actually do so – because they fear the potential repercussions of not doing so. Suspicions that the survey was state-sponsored revealed fears of political surveillance.
  • Africans are much more likely to vote for incumbents in places where there are few effective parliamentary parties. In countries such as Tanzania, Namibia and Mozambique, voters essentially face the option of endorsing or rejecting a form of single party rule. A shift from a system in which one party is dominant to a multi-party system reduces intended support for the ruling party by 31 per cent.
  • Women and rural inhabitants are significantly more likely to vote for the ruling party, but other demographics like age, education and income remain insignificant.
  • If material concerns outweigh ethnic sentiments, this implies African politicians must establish a record of social and economic delivery to be consistently re-elected.

Source

Bratton, M., Bhavnani, R. and Chen, T.-H., 2011, 'Voting Intentions in Africa: Ethnic, Economic or Partisan?', Working Paper No. 127, Afrobarometer, South Africa

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