What factors facilitate and contribute to the transfer of different types of weapons, small arms and light weapons (SALW) in particular, to non-state armed groups (NSAGs)? How can the international community attempt to control these transfers? This article from Disarmament Forum examines the transfer of weapons to NSAGs. It describes how the post-Cold War security landscape and globalisation have enabled the transfer of arms to NSAGs.
The end of the Cold War stopped the supply of arms from major powers to NSAGs, but also created a new market for illegal weapons. At the same time, globalisation, by removing barriers to the flow of goods and capital, also made the transfer of weapons much easier. As a result, NSAGs are better armed and more capable of challenging the state’s monopoly of force and criminals have also been empowered.
The issue of arms supplies to non-state actors (NSAs) is now on the international agenda and moving forward. Types of weapons that are or may be issues of particular concern with regard to NSAGs include the following:
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) – the implications of NSAGs procuring WMDs should not be underestimated. However, there appears to be little demand among most NSAGs for WMDs, since WMDs are of little use for achieving political ends.
- Conventional weapons systems – NSAGs tend to acquire conventional weapons from the opposition rather than from external actors. Such weapons are generally of little practical use to NSAGs, but can have significant symbolic value.
- Illegal SALW – SALW are the weapons of choice for NSAGs, since they are light and mobile and thus suited to guerrilla warfare and insurgency tactics. SALW transfers are also more practical for states who wish to transfer arms covertly.
- Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) – while MANPADS are easy to use, portable and relatively cheap, they have yet to develop into a significant threat. Concern over MANPADS has increased as a result of the war on terror, however.
- Whether the issue of weapons transfers to NSAs becomes an item on the agenda for a possible Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) remains to be seen. If the ATT debate takes root, it would represent a wasted opportunity if the NSA issue were to be excluded.
- The characteristics of SALW encourage high levels of demand and pose intractable problems for effective control of extant and future stocks. Even with progress at the global level, a comprehensive and verifiable regime will remain a distant prospect.
- An issue to be confronted is the responsibility of suppliers. Attempts to understand the architecture required to control the arms trade have raised the question of whether prime responsibility should rest with producers.
- A final issue concerns times when control may not necessarily be the best way forward. Some states may be unable to maintain a monopoly on force, while others may abuse this monopoly. What controls are appropriate in these circumstances?
