How can ripeness theory be improved to further understanding of conflict resolution processes? This paper from George Mason University recasts ripeness theory to create a new variant, ‘readiness theory’. The recast theory argues that an actor’s readiness for conflict resolution is a function of both motivation to end the conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation. The model defines ripeness as the breadth of the ‘central coalition’ of ready individuals and of subgroups, a coalition that spans both sides of the conflict divide.
Ripeness theory, in its most common version, concerns the psychological states that encourage parties who are involved in severe conflict to move into negotiation—either bilateral or mediated. The original core theory, first devised by I. William Zartman, asserts that the conjunction of just two conditions—a mutual hurting stalemate and a perceived way out—is necessary, though not sufficient, for conflict to move into negotiation. Revised and adapted over time by scholars and practitioners, ripeness theory has served as a critical tool in conflict resolution over the past decades.
Ripeness theory, however, can be criticised for being insufficiently dynamic and flexible. Recasting the theory in conventional psychological terms—using the language of variables rather than necessary states and focusing on the psychological states of individual actors rather than on joint psychological states—gives us a new variation on the theory for conflict resolution, ‘readiness theory’. Readiness theory’s robustness and applicability can be demonstrated in that it appears to:
- Fit more historical cases than the original
- Be more heuristic in the sense of suggesting testable theoretical propositions
- Have greater reach, thus casting light on concession making, agreement, compliance, and third-party activation.
A persistent criticism of ripeness theory is that it lacks a political dimension, relying as it does on individual leader decision-making. Readiness theory allows us to analyse those political processes by looking at the readiness for negotiation of the various factions that make up a polity rather than looking only at leader readiness. Using political spectrum analysis the theory can build a political model of ripeness; a conflict is ripe for resolution to the extent that there is a broad central coalition of people across the political spectrum who are ready for negotiation. The better organised or armed the extremists are on either side, the broader the coalition must be on that side, so as to incorporate or neutralise the extremists and thus prevent them from spoiling the negotiation or the agreement.
Readiness theory, in its incorporation of dynamic factors and processes, unfortunately loses the simplicity of the original ripeness theory, but it compensates for this by moving thinking on conflict resolution forward. Yet, there is still plenty of room for development. Indeed, readiness theory also shares two limitations with ripeness theory that should elicit further attention from scholars:
- It focuses on two-party conflicts despite the increasing prevalence of conflicts involving multiple players
- It is better at explaining past peace processes than predicting the timing or character of future events.
