What dynamics influence the democratic governance of the security sector in Southern Africa? This paper reports on a workshop that brought together regional experts, academics, civil society representatives and national and regional security practitioners. Participants found that, despite apparent democratic transitions in many states, deficits of security governance, leadership, conceptualisation and regionalism remain. Problems include the questionable behaviour of security actors towards citizens, and partisan, regime-centred security structures. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and member states should adopt a comprehensive human security approach and encourage greater involvement by civil society in the security debate, including women’s groups.
It is important to consider how traditional security sector tasks accommodate non-traditional security vulnerabilities; the region’s main security challenges relate to human security and are embedded in socio-economic and environmental conditions and in economic disparities. In Namibia, South Africa and Botswana, for example, there are severe economic inequalities (that may threaten state stability). In addition, growing water stress and unplanned urban drift may lead to settlement patterns in which service provision, including policing, becomes increasingly difficult.
In terms of security sector governance in Southern Africa, the legal enunciation of civilian control, oversight and democratic norms and standards is adequate, but implementation is tenuous. Implementation is hindered by weak institutions, human and financial constraints, party partisanship and political interference. Further findings are that:
- Poor regulation of national assets and weak fiscal functions, including the collection of tax revenues and trade tariffs, make adequate, transparent security funding difficult.
- Security institutions are under-resourced and suffer from skills shortages. Labour relations in the sector are increasingly contested.
- The independence of the judiciary is, in some instances, compromised. In all instances, lack of capacity results in severe backlogs.
- The penal sector is often overlooked and suffers from a lack of investment. Throughout the region, prison conditions are harsh.
- There is a lack of coherent, integrated national and regional security strategies that enable efficient resource usage and alignment between national and regional priorities and approaches.
- Civil society is, in general, not meaningfully engaged in the security discourse (either nationally or regionally) or in the oversight of national security institutions. CSOs have largely been excluded by states and the SADC and are ill-equipped to participate.
- Poorly conceptualised and implemented disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes: 1) risk weapons circulation, criminal activity and potential remobilisation; 2) have left many ex-combatants vulnerable to criminal and political exploitation; and 3)lack coherent frameworks covering the needs of war veterans.
To participate in security debates, civil society and the media require access to information and enhanced security fluency. Further:
- Policing and correctional services require significant investment in resourcing and training and in the development of a rights-respecting culture. Alternatives to incarceration need to be explored.
- More attention must be given to the management of human resources (specifically, to grievance procedures, recruitment and retention, and pay).
- The UNIVISA (single visa) should be implemented to address cross-border crime, and to establish a common border management system. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs’ Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) should plan for the better management of trafficking, terrorism and illegal migration.
- Effective regulation (such as an interlocking framework of national, regional and international control mechanisms) and oversight are needed for Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). Governance mechanisms require subtlety to adapt to PMSCs’ changing role (from enforcement to greater involvement in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction).
- To mainstream gender issues in security institutions, four areas require attention: 1) Mandate: Do goals include or exclude women – and which women? 2) Operations: practices, incentive systems and performance measures, informal cultures; 3) Staff composition: the division of labour and power between different social groups; 4) Accountability systems: how do internal and external mechanisms monitor and correct mistakes?
- To enhance regional security integration, enforcement mechanisms are needed for non-compliance with SADC protocols.
