Political settlement
A political settlement can be understood as: ‘the forging of a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power’ (Whaites, 2008, p. 4). It is a process – and not necessarily formally agreed, or even discussed. Political settlements often extend beyond elites and act to bind together state and society, and provide legitimacy for political leadership.
Parks and Cole (2010) argue that the political settlement can often be the primary factor determining the success or failure of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, and a key underlying determinant of state fragility or resilience. A frequently held view is that the political settlement must precede reforms in all other areas, and should inform approaches to priorities and sequencing (e.g. Whaites, 2008). The OECD (2008) argues that the priority of statebuilding and peacebuilding should be to address political governance to enable the state and society to reconcile their expectations of one another and determine whether security provision meets citizens’ needs.
However, as political settlements are constantly evolving, and are often intractable, there is generally no clear point when all actors would agree one has been established. This complicates the idea that a political settlement should precede progress in other areas. In practice, external actors often do not wait for a political settlement – e.g. in Afghanistan.
Analysis of political settlements tends to focus on the national level (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013). But it is considered important to pay more attention to ideas and transnational factors (ibid.), and to the subnational level to understand possible regional tensions (Parks & Cole, 2010).
Key challenges, trade-offs and relationship with other state functions
Political settlements and security are closely linked. In conflict-affected situations, a key question is how far security and development can proceed in the absence of a political settlement. In these contexts, achieving a political settlement may be a long-term and elusive goal. Where agreement on the organisation of political power is achieved, it may be exclusive, which may undermine its long-term stability.
Evidence is mixed on whether donors should engage where there is an exclusive political settlement. Research emphasises that the inclusiveness of the political settlement can affect the potential for political stability (DFID, 2010a). Exclusive political settlements may be unstable in the long term, but may bring short-term peace and developmental gains. Conversely, attempts to challenge an exclusionary political settlement can lead to short-term instability or conflict. Lindemann (2008, p.1) argues that the ability of post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability depends on whether, and to what extent, ruling political parties can overcome legacies of social fragmentation and establish ‘inclusive elite bargains’. However, there are examples of successful exclusive political settlements (e.g. Somaliland – see Box 2). Supporting exclusive political settlements may contradict the values of development agencies and lead to ‘coherence dilemmas’ (see Cross-cutting trade-offs).
The role of external donors in political settlements requires clear definitions and limits, to protect the sovereignty of partner countries (Parks & Cole, 2010). Parks & Cole (2010) suggest that a key challenge for donors in influencing political settlements is to prioritise among four interrelated and sometimes contradictory goals: stability, conduciveness to development, inclusiveness, and reduced elite predation (Parks & Cole, 2010). External engagement in political settlements has in some cases led to donors almost becoming part of the political settlement (e.g. Nepal). However, donors usually play a small role at the margins of political settlements.
Democratic reforms and political liberalisation
There are mixed perspectives on whether, when and how and to carry out institutional reforms to promote democratisation in FCAS. The extensive literature on this issue tends to focus on elections. Political liberalisation activities also relate to: constitutional and law reform; rights and inclusion of minority and marginalised groups; accountability mechanisms; and media and civil society activities (Timilsina, 2007).
Some (generally older, peacebuilding) literature argues that promoting political liberalisation in countries that have experienced civil war creates the conditions for peace, as democratisation is expected to shift societal conflicts away from war to electoral politics. However, evidence from peacebuilding operations suggests that political and economic liberalisation can increase the likelihood of violence (Paris, 2004).
There is a lively debate between democratic ‘sequentialists’ (who argue that democratic reforms should follow progress on rule of law and state effectiveness) and ‘gradualists’ (who advocate small simultaneous reforms in multiple state functions) (Carothers, 2007). Carothers (2007) suggests that statebuilding should not indefinitely postpone core democratisation activities.
Key challenges, trade-offs and relationship with other state functions
The focus on early democracy promotion has dwindled in light of evidence of the relationship between elections and civil unrest (e.g. Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2007). Some authors identify democratic reforms and political liberalisation as high-risk activities that can produce unintended effects (see Box 4) (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008; Carothers, 2007).
Box 4: Case study – 2007 Kenyan elections and the ensuing crisis
Branch and Cheeseman (2008) suggest that political liberalisation in Kenya, combined with elite fragmentation and state informalisation, contributed to the 2007 post-election crisis. They argue the climate of multi-party politics created opportunities for leaders to abandon the ruling party, and this contributed to elite fragmentation. The elections increased the incentives for corruption, fuelling state informalisation (including theft of state funds, elite patronage and the funding of gangs). This all combined to reduce citizen trust in state institutions.
Source: Branch & Cheeseman (2008)
Parks and Cole (2010) note that holding elections rarely results in a more inclusive political settlement, and instead can lead to more unstable and exclusive political settlements.
Carothers (2007) argues that a state needs a minimal functional capacity and a monopoly of force before being able to pursue sustainable, pluralistic political development. He argues against democratic sequentialists who claim that a ‘well-functioning state’ (rather than a minimally functioning state) is needed first (Carothers, 2007, p.19).
While Carothers denies there are preconditions for democratisation reforms, he identifies ‘core facilitators’ (2007, p.24). These include: level of economic development; concentration of national wealth; identity-based divisions; historical experience with political pluralism; and whether neighbouring countries are democratic.
- For a useful summary of key texts on political settlements see Routley, L. (n.d.) Annotated bibliography on developmental states, political settlements and citizenship formation. Manchester: ESID.
- See GSDRC Topic Guide on Fragile States.
- Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2008). Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. African Affairs, 108(430), 1–26.
See document online - Carothers, T. (2007). The Sequencing Fallacy. Journal of Democracy, 18(1), 12–27.
See document online - Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. & Söderbom, M. (2007). Post-Conflict Risks. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
See document online - DFID. (2010a). Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper. London: DFID
See document online - Golooba-Mutebi, F & Hickey, S. (2013). Investigating the links between political settlements and inclusive development in Uganda: towards a research agenda (Working Paper 20). Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre.
See document online - Lindemann, S. (2008). Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa (Crisis States Research Centre). London: London School of Economics (LSE).
See document online - OECD. (2008). Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations. From Fragility to Resilience. Paris: OECD.
See document online - Paris, R. (2004). Introduction. In At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, pp. 1-10. Cambridge University Press.
- Parks, T. & Cole, W. (2010). Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice (Occasional Paper no. 2). San Fransisco: The Asia Foundation.
See document online - Timilsina, A. R. (2007). Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post?conflict Countries (Unpublised dissertation). Pardee RAND Graduate School.
See document online - Whaites, A. (2008). States in development: understanding state-building (DFID Working Paper). London: DFID.
See document online