The very idea that it is possible, and preferential, to sequence reform areas is controversial.
Non-linear, complex development trajectories
The literature increasingly notes that development is non-linear and complex (e.g. Rihani, 2002). Recurring civil wars have also undermined the idea that movement from violence to sustained security is linear (World Bank, 2011b). Despite this, the World Bank (2011a, p.6) notes that ‘the international development community has been handicapped by a somewhat linear view of the state-building process’.
The idea of linear development trajectories supports top-down, technocratic, management structures. Within the practitioner literature, stabilisation theory has been critiqued for assuming interventions can be implemented in a linear way (Dennys & Fitz-Gerald, 2011). The IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes were based on a linear development model (Rihani, 2002). This thinking is also evident in the popular distilling of lessons learned from one experience, to inform other decisions (Rihani, 2002), and in the use of inflexible project frameworks.
While the application and adaptation of the scientific understanding of complexity has been controversial, it is an increasing area of focus in development thinking (Ramalingam, Jones, Reba & Young, 2009). Complexity theory suggests that development is non-linear and constantly evolving, involves many interdependent dynamics and elements, is sensitive to initial conditions, is self-organised, results cannot be linked to specific causes, and feedback processes within systems promote and inhibit change (Ramalingam et al., 2009, p.viii).
Ideal-type state models versus context-specific models
Debates about sequencing and prioritising reforms have been criticised because of the limited feasibility of implementing ideal-type state models in situations where state institutions are weak. Organisational systems and incentives mean that donors still often approach statebuilding and peacebuilding as a technocratic process with standard principles and targets.
Principles-based approaches tend to be used because no one-size-fits-all. However, principles-based approaches can lack appropriateness to local contexts and be too inflexible. Pritchett and de Weijer (2010, p.2) warn of ‘isomorphic mimicry’– when organisations pretend to reform by changing appearances rather than actions. They argue that this can lead to ‘capability traps’ – when state capability stagnates or deteriorates, despite development funds and policies (Pritchett and de Weijer, 2010; Andrews, Pritchett & Woolcock, 2012).
The literature highlights the importance of context-specific priorities and sequencing (Grindle, 2004), and of holistic assessment of needs and context that link to the specific capacities and needs of the end user. Some authors argue that it is more relevant to support flexibility, participation, evaluation and adjustment of country transitions than a best-practice set of sequences (Bellina et al., 2009). Others highlight the strengths of working iteratively (Andrews et al., 2012). The WDR 2011 underlines that while ‘copying does not work’ there is still value in understanding and learning from other countries’ experiences (World Bank, 2011b, p.146).
The roles of external actors
There is consensus in the literature that statebuilding is a broadly endogenous and iterative process, therefore sequencing and prioritisation decisions should be led by the host country (OECD, 2008; OECD, 2012b). In some cases the international community has played significant roles in reconstruction efforts (e.g. Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Cambodia and Bosnia), and in other countries statebuilding has been more internally driven (e.g. Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea) (Ottaway, 2002). External actors can also indirectly influence statebuilding processes, for example, through foreign policy or trade decisions (Whaites, 2008).
When a donor is involved in peacebuilding and statebuilding activities, they are usually just one actor among many. The choices available to donors are often very limited. For example, as Fukuyama notes (2004, pp.120-123): ‘If the state lacks popular legitimacy and the population are not engaged and actively supporting state capacity-building measures then there is only a limited amount that can be achieved by external technical advisors’. Donors’ choices are shaped by a mix of contextual and external factors. Among these are the domestic politics and priorities of their own countries as well as those of the host government.
In practice, donors rarely have enough time or financial resources to implement peacebuilding and statebuilding activities to the levels initially envisaged. And as FCAS are complex and changeable environments, decisions are often made opportunistically as events occur and as opportunities arise.
The different sections of a donor government working in FCAS (e.g. defence, development, humanitarian, and diplomatic) may have different approaches, priorities, staff, and understanding of the challenges. This can affect choices over sequencing, prioritisation, timelines, allocation of funding and roles among the sections.
The role of external actors in influencing the capability, authority, and legitimacy of the state is widely contested (Paris & Sisk, 2007). Strategic planning and decisions about national priorities are inherently political. Paris and Sisk (2007, p.4) identify tensions and contradictions of external involvement in statebuilding, including: using intervention to foster self-government; the promotion of universal values for local problems; external actors defining legitimate leaders; and short-term imperatives versus long-term objectives.
Some argue that external actors should ‘do nothing’. The literature contains many examples of statebuilding and peacebuilding reforms that have not achieved their goals, or that have led to unintended consequences. There is evidence of successful statebuilding processes where donors have not intervened (see Box 2). However, there is often political pressure for donors to be seen to be ‘doing something’ in response to media coverage and public demand. Therefore, ‘do nothing’ is rarely considered feasible.
Box 2: Doing nothing in Somaliland
Phillips (2013) argues that the lack of external assistance in Somaliland was beneficial to the emergence of the political settlement, the maintenance of peace, and other political and developmental achievements. Somaliland’s success is compared to the continued fragility in neighbouring Somalia, where much external assistance was provided.
The unrecognised status of the Government of Somaliland made it broadly ineligible for official international grants and loans. Virtually no foreign funding was used to finance the peace conferences in Somaliland between 1991 and 1997. Instead, funding was provided by the domestic population and the diaspora.
This paper finds that it was not simply the lack of direct external assistance that mattered, but the fact that Somalilanders were not pressured to accept ‘template’ political institutions from outside and could negotiate their own locally devised, and locally legitimate, institutional arrangements. There was sufficient time and political space for solutions to evolve, rather than an attempt to impose predetermined institutional end points. Other influential factors included Somalilanders’ conscious desire for an enclave of peace within the surrounding turmoil; and the quality secondary education received by a disproportionate number of the politicians, activists and technocrats who helped establish Somaliland’s stability.
Somaliland’s emergence from civil conflict and formation of a political settlement also involved struggles to control the means of legitimate coercion, and a high degree of collusion between the political and economic elites. This contrasts with conventional conflict prevention programmes that emphasise grassroots consensus and inclusion.
Finally, the lack of external assistance meant that the incentives for elites to cooperate with one another were primarily local. This was at odds with how peace was being pursued in the rest of Somalia, where external actors were spending substantial sums to bring political competitors to the negotiating table.
Source: Phillips (2013)
- The idea of linear country development suggests that a development trajectory is ordered and predictable, that known results can be obtained from the input of certain variables, and that the process has a beginning and an end (Rihani, 2002). Key works in this area include Rostow in 1960 and Toye in 1987.
- See also a Development Drums podcast and presentation by Barder in 2012.
- For example, in the UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office works on the immediate, day to day political issues, and tends to think of change as influencing individuals (reformers). The Ministry of Defence has more medium-term priorities, and tends to work on stabilisation, security sector reform, and capacity building/training. Meanwhile DFID has more long-term priorities, and tends to work on more structural development issues.
- Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2012) Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
See document online - Bellina S., Darbon D., Eriksen S. S., & Sending O. J. (2009). The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Oslo.
See document online - Dennys, C. & Fitz-Gerald, A. M. (2011). Intervention hangovers in stabilisation operations. Case studies from Afghanistan and Iraq (DIIS Working Paper 2011:16). Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
See document online - Fukuyama, F. (2004). State Building: Governance and Order in the Twenty-First Century. London: Profile Books.
- Grindle, M. S. (2004). Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries. Governance, 17(4), 525-548.
See document online - OECD. (2008). Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations. From Fragility to Resilience. Paris: OECD.
See document online - OECD. (2012b). Coherent planning and prioritisation. In International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice, pp. 31-43. Paris: OECD.
See document online - Ottaway, M. (2002). Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States. Development and Change, 33(5), 1001-1023.
See document online - Paris, R. & Sisk, T. (2007). Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding (Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding). New York: International Peace Academy.
See document online - Phillips, A. (2013). Political Settlements and State Formation: The Case of Somaliland (Research Paper 23). Birmingham: Developmental Leadership Program, University of Birmingham.
See document online - Pritchett, L. & de Weijer, F. (2010). Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap? (WDR 2011 Background Paper). Washington, DC: World Bank.
See document online - Ramalingam, B., Jones, H., Reba, T., & Young, J. (2009). Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts. London: ODI.
See document online - Rihani, S. (2002). Complex systems theory and development practice: Understanding non-linear realities. Zed Books.
See document online - Whaites, A. (2008). States in development: understanding state-building (DFID Working Paper). London: DFID.
See document online - World Bank. (2011a). Governance and Public Sector Reconstruction and Programming in Fragile and Conflict-affected States. Synthesis: Prioritization, Sequencing and Trade-offs (Guidance note). Unpublished.
- World Bank. (2011b). World Development Report 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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