Donors have tended to focus on formal political institutions and structures. Although these are important, it is essential to recognise that much political activity takes place according to informal norms and systems in developing countries. Whilst formal political systems are generally publicly announced, for example in laws, regulations and codes, informal systems are embedded in socio-cultural institutions, norms and standards. For this reason, informal political systems that can be negative for development (e.g. clientelism and patrimonialism) are extremely difficult to eradicate.
The relative influence of formal and informal political systems in local and national politics is a critical debate. The literature has tended to presume a clear dichotomy between formal and informal, traditional and modern, and democratic and non-democratic political systems. But in reality, these distinctions are not so clear, and formal and informal systems overlap and interrelate.
This page considers why non-democratic political traditions continue to flourish in certain areas and how informal institutions impact political governance. The GSDRC’s related guide on political economy analysis provides further information.
Page contents
- Customary institutions and democratic governance
- Traditional and religious leadership
- Elites and institutions
- Patronage politics
- Implications for donors
- Useful websites
Customary institutions and democratic governance
‘Customary’ or ‘traditional’ political institutions (e.g. chiefdoms, religious organisations and local village councils) are often criticised for being undemocratic and non-participatory. In particular, they have been accused of perpetuating discrimination according to gender, caste or race. Are these political institutions changing? How do they interact with formal political structures, and do they drive or block pro-poor development?
The following papers discuss the relationship between informal political systems and formal democracy.
Sackey, M. (2012). ‘The role of customary governance systems for local democracy, good governance and service delivery: The case of Ghana’. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Local governance, decentralization and democracy are key components of the traditional Ghanaian institution of chieftaincy. This paper finds that while chieftaincy does not currently form part of the formal local government administration structure, it maintains an informal and sacrosanct niche in local governance. The roles of the institution need to be redefined and clarified within the nexus of traditions, demands of good governance and modern local democracy to enable it to provide a complementary conduit for effective and efficient local governance for development.
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AnanthPur, K., 2004, ‘Rivalry or Synergy? Formal and Informal Local Governance in Rural India’, Working paper no. 226, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) were not expected to withstand the advent of democracy and the forces of modernisation in rural India. How have ILGIs adapted to interact with their newer formal counterparts – the elected government institutions? This paper, compiled for the Institute of Development Studies, presents a holistic view of ILGIs that considers their progressive role in village governance and service delivery. It presents a framework to explain why ILGIs are more likely to survive in India than in other countries in the South.
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Traditional and religious leadership
There is considerable debate about how and whether formal political institutions can work alongside traditional leadership systems and whether or not traditional leadership supports or undermines democratic governance.
Logan, C., 2008, ‘Traditional Leaders In Modern Africa: Can Democracy And The Chief Co-Exist?’, Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 93, Cape Town
Can democracy and the African chief co-exist? This study from Michigan State University analyses Afrobarometer survey data to explore popular perceptions of elected and traditional leaders. Positive attitudes toward chiefs are not incompatible with democracy – and vice versa. Furthermore, positive perceptions of chiefs and of elected leaders are strongly linked. African societies are adept at integrating seemingly incompatible institutional structures, such as traditional institutions.
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Beall, J., 2005, ‘Exit, Voice and Tradition: Loyalty to Chieftainship and Democracy in Metropolitan Durban, South Africa’, Crisis States Programme Working Paper no. 59, Development Studies Institute, London
Strains on democratic governance in many parts of Africa have led to a resurgence of the salience of traditional authority. This paper, compiled for the Crisis States Research Centre, examines the challenges posed for democratic consolidation arising from the accommodation of traditional authorities in city government in Durban, South Africa. Is chieftaincy a retrograde step or does institutional pluralism offer greater political flexibility and stability? These questions are explored with reference to Albert Hirschman’s seminal thesis on exit, voice and loyalty.
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Logan, C., 2011, ‘The Roots of Resilience: Exploring Popular Support for African Traditional Authorities’, Working Paper no. 128, Afrobarometer, South Africa
This examination of 2008-9 Afrobarometer survey data finds intense support for traditional authority across 19 African countries and all socio-demographic groups: large majorities believe that the institution should still play a significant role in local governance. Africans place considerable value on chiefs’ role in managing and resolving conflict, their leadership qualities and their accessibility. Traditional leaders also seem to play an essential symbolic role as representatives of community identity, unity, continuity and stability: they seem to derive their support at least as much from who they are as from what they do. As long as chiefs continue to produce (especially intrinsic) benefits for their communities, they will continue to be perceived as important players who must remain active in local governance if it is to function effectively.
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GSDRC, 2007, ‘Governance in Tribal Environments’, Helpdesk Research Report, GSDRC, Birmingham
The broader literature on traditional structures of authority and leadership tends to agree that the legitimacy of such structures has endured amongst many communities. In some cases, they have provided superior governance and conflict resolution than the state. Nevertheless, there is a need for greater scholarly attention to various important issues relating to traditional governance, such as people’s perceptions of traditional leadership and their motivations for these views, and the relations between local political systems.
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Kleist, N., 2011, ‘Modern Chiefs: Tradition, Development and Return among Traditional Authorities in Ghana’, African Affairs, vol. 110, no. 441, pp.629-647
There is a growing trend in Ghana of appointing traditional authorities with an international migrant background. This study shows that Ghanaian chiefs who have lived abroad are expected to draw on transnational networks and experiences to bring development and innovation to their areas. Some collaborate with international development agencies, NGOs, and migrants, and tour European and North American countries. ‘Return chiefs’ must balance ‘the modern’ and ‘the traditional’, and their practices in negotiating this tension are both local and global.
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Elites and institutions
What is the role of elites in the development of formal and informal political institutions? How do they influence the exercise of power and representation at local level? Elites are often the people who make or shape the main political and economic decisions in a country, but there is considerable disagreement about the extent to which they support or subvert pro-poor development.
Leftwich, A. (2010) ‘Beyond Institutions: Rethinking the Role of Leader, Elites and Coalitions in the Institutional Formation of Developmental States and Strategies’, Forum for Development Studies, 37(1), pp. 93-111
Development practitioners and policymakers have tended to rely heavily on structuralist approaches with an emphasis on institutions and institution building. They have failed to take account of agential factors in the design, formation and maintenance of institutions, and for important success stories that run against general patterns of institutional failure or corruption. Policymakers need to have a better understanding of the role of human agency in developmental processes and the role of leaders, elites and coalitions.
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Laws, E. (2012) ‘Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National Unity: A Conceptual Study’, Developmental Leadership Program
How should political settlements be defined and understood? How should elite pacts and governments of national unity (GNUs) be defined and understood? The concept of the ‘political settlement’ has been used in a variety of subtly, but significantly, different ways. Sometimes it has been used interchangeably with ‘elite pacts’, ‘elite bargains’ or ‘peace agreements’. This paper surveys and clarifies the conceptual field.
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Lindemann S., 2008, ‘Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Discussion Paper 15, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s most conflict-intensive region. But why have some African states experienced civil war, while others have managed to maintain political stability? This discussion paper from the Crisis States Research Centre argues that the ability of post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability depends on the ability of the ruling political parties to overcome the historical legacy of social fragmentation. Creating inclusive elite bargains can bring stability while exclusionary elite bargains give rise to trajectories of civil war.
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Patronage politics
‘Clientelism’ and ‘patron-client’ politics occur in contexts where strong personal relationships between politicians and their followers shape political decisions on the basis of mutual gain. Political patrons may bestow jobs, money and opportunities on their clients in return for political support. Often, in clientelistic states, the distinction between private resources of political leaders and state resources breaks down, regardless of the presence of formal modern political institutions. Although neo-patrimonial regimes are often bad for economic development, this is not always the case. Where leaders are able to centralise economic rents and develop a long-term strategy, neo-patrimonialism can support development.
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. and Verdier, T., 2003, ‘Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule’, Paper presented at the European Economic Association Annual Meeting, 24 August, Stockholm
How and why do kleptocracies (regimes based on personal rule) last so long in some developing countries, despite the lack of a significant support base? How can the study of policymaking in weakly-institutionalised societies help to understand the emergence of these regimes? This paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research proposes a model to describe the strategies of many kleptocratic regimes, and includes historical case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Dominican Republic.
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Arriola, L., 2009, ‘Patronage and Political Stability in Africa&rsrsquo;, in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 42, no. 10, pp.1339-1362
Ministerial appointments to the cabinet are used in this study as a proxy for changes in a leader’s patronage coalition size. Using time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.
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van Wyk, J-A., 2007, ‘Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers?’ ACCORD Occasional Paper Series: Volume 2, Number 1, South Africa
What impact has leadership had on the development of African states? This paper from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) reviews and analyses the multiple layers of formal and informal political leadership in post-colonial Africa. Political leaders are the primary holders, controllers and distributors of power and resources in a particular institution and/or territory. Contemporary African leaders operate in an environment constrained by colonial legacies and instability. Leadership is characteristically neo-patrimonial, featuring presidentialism, clientelism, the use of state resources and the centralisation of power.
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Lindberg, S.I., (2010). What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 48(1): 117-142
How African politicians, especially legislators, behave on a daily basis is still largely unknown. This article gives an empirical account of the daily accountability pressures and the strategies that Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana employ in responding to the demands that they face. While literature on political clientelism focuses on explanatory factors like lack of political credibility, political machines capable of effective monitoring, autonomy of brokers, high levels of poverty, and political competitiveness, the role of institutions has been overlooked. While the existing literature suggests that political clientelism is an optimal strategy in the context of weak institutions, the present analysis finds that the institution of the office of Member of Parliament in Ghana is strong, but shaped by informal norms in ways that favour the provision of private goods in clientelistic networks.
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Vicente, P., and Wantcheckon, L. (2009) Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 25 (2): 292-305
Electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development. This paper reviews the literature on clientelism and vote buying and proposes the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena. Clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support. The results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism. In addition, voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour. We argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions, as a way effectively to increase public-good political accountability.
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Kelsall, T., 2011, ‘Rethinking the Relationship between Neo-patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa’, IDS Bulletin, Vol.42, No. 2, pp. 76-87
Is it possible to boost poverty-reducing economic investment and growth in Africa by working with, rather than against, neo-patrimonial politics? This study of seven ‘middle African’ countries shows that neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends – if pro-market, pro-rural policies and an institutional system for centralising and distributing economic rents with a long-term view are in place. However, problems associated with developmental patrimonial systems include: a potential loss of civil liberties; lack of sustainability; and inapplicability in some country contexts.
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Implications for donors
Informal and customary political systems have important implications for how development is approached. For example, how can donors support pro-poor development in the context of deeply-rooted anti-democratic behaviour? Recent research from the Africa Power and Politics Programme suggests that donors should focus on ‘working with the grain’ by building on existing institutional arrangements that have clear benefits.
Cammack, D., 2007, ‘The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?’, Development Policy Review, 2007, 25 (5): 599-614
When sub-Saharan African government institutions do not function as expected by international aid agencies, they are often labelled dysfunctional, but their action is quite logical when viewed through a ‘neopatrimonial lens’. This Development Policy Review article explains the ‘logic’ behind neopatrimonial practices. For example, although politicians understand that professionalising their bureaucracy will stimulate development, they prevent this from occurring to avoid exposing their corrupt, clientelist networks. Donors must begin to act politically – to confront directly the political logic that undermines economic development and democratic consolidation.
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Hyden, G., 2008, ‘Institutions, Power and Policy Outcomes in Africa’, Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP), Discussion Paper No. 2, Overseas Development Institute, London
In Africa, as elsewhere, the paths to development are dependent on historical institutional context, and cannot be imposed from outside. This paper, by the Africa Power and Politics Programme, argues that in African states informal institutions dominate power relations but are not understood, and so development policies lack any real traction. A model of how formal and informal institutions interact is proposed and linked to an analysis of power itself – its basis, reach, exercise, nature and consequences. This shows that conventional models of development planning cannot work in Africa, where the production and distribution of ‘public goods’ are highly politicised and personalised.
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Booth, D., 2011, ‘Governance for Development in Africa: Building on What Works’, Policy Brief 1, Africa Power and Politics Programme, Overseas Development Institute, London
How can a ‘best fit’ approach to governance improve development effectiveness? In its present form, ‘good governance’ is not evidence based. This brief highlights the need to build on the strengths of existing institutional arrangements when supporting governance reform in developing countries. It argues that governance assistance should be refocused on nurturing developmental leadership.
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Further resources
- The Africa Power and Politics Research Programme looked at identifying ways of exercising power, doing politics and building states that might work better for development and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa than the arrangements now in place.