What are the roots of conflict in northern Uganda? This monograph, by the Institute for Security Studies, argues that the war emerged on two fronts: initially as a popular rebellion against the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) and later transformed by the insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The protracted nature of the war has created new conflict dynamics and led to serious consequences such as mass displacement and a military response that often fails to protect civilians. These consequences sustain a cycle of violence.
Uganda’s history of repeated power struggles has left a legacy of violence and militarism, particularly in the North. Leaders since independence have exploited deep-rooted divisions between the North and South.
There are three distinctive, yet interlinked, strands of the conflict in Northern Uganda, involving tension between the civilian population, the LRA forces, and the government. These can be described as follows:
- Firstly, the root causes behind the popular rebellion against the NRM have never been addressed. This continues to feed the grievances of the civilian population and if unaddressed, may re-surface and cause renewed violence.
- Secondly, the root causes have been compounded by the violent campaign of the LRA, which finds little support among the population. Civilians are the main victims of violence and child soldiers have been recruited.
- Thirdly, the devastating consequences of war have become secondary causes of the war itself, thus sustaining the conflict. These include political and economic marginalisation and mass displacement.
Military responses to the LRA insurgency are antithetical to the needs of the civilian population because they threaten their long-term security. The government of Uganda should protect and defend communities, rather than focus exclusively on eliminating the LRA (this fuels the LRA agenda). Previous failed attempts to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda suggest that future negotiations should:
- Engage in open-ended and flexible negotiations that could function outside a political framework. These should aim to understand the motivations of the LRA, whilst at the same time not endorsing the actions of insurgent forces.
- Develop confidence-building measures to create trust between the government and civilians as an integral part of the peace process.
- Establish a truth and reconciliation process to enable Ugandans to speak openly about past violence in regions such as the Luwero Triangle, West Nile, and in Northern and Western Uganda.
- Deal with escalating corruption. Investigations into the alleged payments to ‘ghost soldiers’ are a first step and should be backed up by strong enforcement measures to ensure the full restitution of funds and resources obtained through corrupt practices.
- Recognise the long-term threats posed by the increasing number of army militias, which should be disbanded or integrated into the national army.
- Undertake post-conflict reconstruction to deal with the economic and social effects of mass displacement. This process should be open to public debate and scrutiny to ensure the proper management of reconstruction funds.
- Extend the Amnesty Act for the duration of the present conflict as it is essential for ending the war and should not exclude leading LRA commanders.
- Ensure that Ugandan foreign policy reflects a spirit of friendship towards its neighbours, rather than mutual suspicion. Uganda’s conflict has international dimensions so positive relations with its neighbours, particularly Sudan, should be encouraged.
