The general trend in African politics since the decline of one-party regimes has been a development toward greater executive dominance. In the absence of many studies that can provide comparative analysis across countries this paper from the Chr. Michelsen Institute uses illustrations from Tanzania. It sets out to develop a framework for investigation of the accountability relationship between the legislature and the executive.
In 1992 Tanzania formally separated the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) from the government and adopted a multiparty system. Regime transition took place under the CCM, and was effected smoothly, but gave the leadership of the ruling party the opportunity for strong influence on the process. Other than regular multiparty elections, little progress has been made towards democratic consolidation, and no strong opposition has emerged.
The legislature is characterised by an accountability relationship to both the executive (horizontally) and the electorate (vertically). This paper examines the parliamentary functions considered most central to holding the executive accountable – legitimation and decisional/influence functions. In essential components these are social legitimacy and policy-making function, respectively. These functions depend on two sets of key variables: External and internal. The external variables provide the legislature’s basic accountability, and the internal variables can reinforce it, but not determine it.
There is no clear-cut divide between external and internal variables. However, a tentative guideline may provide indicators to analyse the legislature’s basic relationship to the executive. Core external variables include constitutional powers, social legitimacy and external actors. Core internal variables include the committee system, party discipline and the chamber:
- Constitutional powers: Non-legislative powers (cabinet formation, censure, cabinet dismissal, powers of dissolution) and legislative powers (veto rights, budgetary powers, exclusive rights to initiate legislation).
- Social legitimacy: Mass perceptions and elite perceptions of the legislature.
- External actors: Framework for implementation of pro-poor politics/other development aid, political preconditions of aid.
- Committee system: Permanence of committees, composition, circulation of membership and chairs, committee set-up relative to administrative structure, place in legislative process, committee jurisdiction, agenda setting powers, degree of partisanship present, resources, regularity of meetings, powers to take evidence, hold hearings, change legislation.
- Party discipline: Party organisation, MPs’ representative role, mechanisms of sanction.
- The chamber: Agenda setting powers, legislative procedures, functioning of question hour, regularity of meetings, attendance.
Using the analytical framework described, a variety of weaknesses in accountability between the executive and legislature are identified, including:
- The Tanzanian’s President’s power of veto effectively functions as a mechanism of pressure ensuring support and compliance with government policy.
- Poverty reduction strategy papers have tended not to include parliament despite the intention of their participatory nature, and may have weakened parliamentary authority.
- Despite good progress in the functioning of committees, bills often do not reach parliament on time, and there is a lack of answerability towards committees. Scarce funding, poor infrastructure and limited time on membership of standing committees all weaken their effectiveness.
- Party discipline is exceptionally strong with the Tanzanian system, undermining parliament’s ability to hold the executive accountable.
- No private member’s bill has been introduced since 1995, due to minimal bill draftsmen, with a bias towards government bills. MP question time is not regarded as genuine opportunity for answerability, but hampered by poor information and a lack of seriousness.
- Public confidence in parliament is extremely high, and voting turnout is good. Given the lack of parliamentary potency, one may expect these positive attitudes to wane if performance is not strengthened.
