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Home»Document Library»Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Library
Cornelius Friesendorf, Susan E. Penksa
2008

Summary

What are the causes and problems of militarised law enforcement in peace operations? How can these be addressed? This paper from International Peacekeeping examines the role of the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). While the military can contribute to law enforcement, such involvement is generally hindered by fear of ‘mission creep’ and lack of preparedness. Preferable alternatives to military involvement (such as international civil police forces collaborating with local officials) are obstructed by lack of political will. Law enforcement should be addressed early and systematically by the deployment of robust forces that avoid excessive use of force.

In post-war interventions, international military forces usually need to help close public security gaps that threaten peacebuilding. They are therefore (reluctantly) involved in tasks including crowd and riot control, arresting suspected war criminals, and fighting organised crime. This is because domestic systems are weak as a result of war, and international police officers are usually deployed late, in insufficient numbers, and without sufficient training and equipment. 

In BiH, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, neglect of law enforcement allowed spoilers of stabilisation efforts to become entrenched. EUFOR’s involvement in BiH, however, indicates a possible model of military cooperation with law enforcement agencies. After EUFOR’s activism in law enforcement during its first term (which began in 2004), in its second term (2006 onwards) the military scaled back such activities and coordinated with international police forces and domestic law enforcement agencies.  

Three partially overlapping factors account for expanded military action in law enforcement in BiH. First, individual policymakers and military commanders have an impact through their interpretation of mission mandates and roles, and their relationships with other decision-makers. Second, regional institutions (NATO and the EU) have developed a broad approach to crisis response, involving civil-military coordination in peace operations, and military involvement in infrastructure development, humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction. Third, perceptions of crime and the rule of law have changed as organised crime, such as trafficking and smuggling, has increased. Fighting crime is increasingly seen as a precondition for successful post-conflict stabilisation efforts. Further findings identify some of EUFOR’s law enforcement strengths and weaknesses and lessons to be learned:

  • EUFOR encouraged BiH law enforcement agencies to do more against crime. It provided police and prosecutors with valuable capabilities, information and intelligence and facilitated cooperation among crime-fighting actors, from the police to tax authorities.
  • EUFOR showed citizens that there was no impunity for criminals and that there would not be another security gap.
  • EUFOR lacked a systematic approach focused on establishing a chain of evidence useable in court, and was not based on a coherent civil–military cooperation doctrine.
  • It is unlikely that EUFOR significantly reduced illegal logging, cross-border smuggling, and other illicit activities
  • Increased business crime means that BiH needs experts in money laundering, tax evasion and business regulation rather than the military.

Military forces are reluctant to take on policing tasks and do so with limited success. However, the alternatives are limited by lack of political will as governments respond to crises instead of preventing them. Policy implications include the following:

  • If domestic institutions cannot provide security, the best option is strong international civil police (CIVPOL) forces, working in partnership with local officials. However, donor governments are reluctant to deploy more, and more competent, CIVPOL officers.
  • Given these problems, constabulary forces could be used to fill security gaps. Constabulary forces are expensive, though, and in high demand. They are deployed in relatively few numbers and, as in BiH and Kosovo, too late.

Source

Friesendorf, C. & Penksa, S. (2008). Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Peacekeeping, 15 (5), pp. 677-694.

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