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Home»Document Library»The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

Library
Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess
2002

Summary

What makes government responsive to citizens’ needs? This paper from the London School of Economics and Political Science highlights the importance of information flows about policy actions. Having an informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for government responsiveness. Evidence from India shows that state governments are more responsive where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral accountability greater; there is a role for both democratic institutions and mass media in ensuring that citizens’ preferences are reflected in policy.

Understanding what makes government responsive to citizens’ needs is particularly important in low-income countries where vulnerable populations rely on state action for survival. Politicians are more likely to respond to demands when electoral turnout is high and political competition intense. Mass media can play a role by enabling vulnerable citizens to monitor the actions of incumbents and to use this information in voting decisions.

These ideas are tested using data from sixteen Indian states from 1958-1992. India has an active press and a large vulnerable population which is regularly affected by natural shocks. Representative democracy and free and independent regional media are key factors in protecting vulnerable citizens.

  • State governments are more responsive to falls in food production and crop flood damage where newspaper circulation and electoral accountability are higher.
  • Newspapers published in state-specific languages tend to report localised events and have a readership of local vulnerable populations. Local language newspapers therefore play a role in making state politicians more responsive to local crises.
  • Greater electoral turnout is associated with greater responsiveness. As food production falls or flood damage increases, having higher turnout in the previous election tends to increase government responsiveness.
  • Levels of public food distribution respond to political competition and the timing of elections, (increasing in election or pre-election years), whereas disaster relief expenditure does not; public food distribution is more visible, and hence politicised.
  • Economic development appears to be relatively unimportant in this data.

Findings are consistent with earlier literature examining the importance of the media in famine relief policy. The results underline the potential role of civil society, and the media in particular, in an effectively functioning democracy.

  • Elections provide an incentive for politicians to perform, which can be enhanced by development of the media. Responsiveness of government to issues such as crisis management is likely to be greater where the media is more developed.
  • Institutions of political competition (such as open elections) are not sufficient to deliver a responsive government unless voters have authority to discipline poorly functioning incumbents. This requires effective institutions for information transmission to voters.
  • Results point to the importance of mechanisms for improving accountability beyond the role of economic development in encouraging government action. This resonates with calls to improve governance in low income countries to enhance the well-being of the poor.
  • There is scope for further work that seeks to link government policy to media development, especially in developing countries.

Source

Besley, T., and Burgess, R., 2002, ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India’, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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