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Home»Document Library»Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies

Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies

Library
A. Carl LeVan
2011

Summary

How should international policymakers respond to evidence of a ‘stolen’ election? This article argues that support for inclusive political institutions needs to take account of the distinction between strengthening states and strengthening democracy. When used in response to flawed elections, pacts guaranteeing political inclusion can promote short-term peace, but they undermine democratisation, accountability and effective government performance. Potential adverse effects of political inclusion can be assessed by: 1) contrasting extra-constitutional pacts with stable political frameworks; 2) differentiating between post-war contexts and low-level conflicts; and 3) weighing short-term benefits against long-term costs. The drawbacks of inclusive political institutions can be moderated by options such as sunset clauses, the even-handed prosecution of human rights violations, and by strengthening checks on executive authority.

For at least two decades, foreign aid and democracy promotion emphasised the importance of building political institutions. But the international response to Kenya’s 2007 violence and the repression by Zimbabwe’s ruling party in 2008 put peace before process: it advocated inclusive power-sharing agreements involving multi-party coalitions. In such circumstances, power-sharing agreements allow stubborn incumbents or electoral losers to negotiate their way to power, and give external legitimacy to elite bargains that distance politicians from citizens. They undermine vertical relationships of accountability, push governments to commit to unsustainable budgets, and create conditions for policy gridlock. Protecting the status quo in Kenya and Zimbabwe allows power-sharing partners to continue to divide up the state’s resources for patronage.

When are inclusive political institutions, such as power-sharing agreements, appropriate? When should less inclusive institutions be defended in spite of political or social costs? In considering political inclusion, it is important to think about three key issues:

  • Origin: Does it arise from an elite pact or a more permanent political framework? Attempts to modify the constitution, even when successfully renegotiated, raise questions of legitimacy. Political inclusion rooted in constitutions and more stable political frameworks offer important advantages.
  • Function: Is its purpose to navigate a way out of war or not? Borrowing post-war remedies is problematic in countries with lower levels of civil strife. It is harder for international involvement to mediate rather than meddle, and human rights issues may appear less urgent.
  • Time horizon: What are the trade-offs between short-term gains and long-term costs? A focus on stopping violence immediately can result in long-term financial burdens and institutional ambiguity being overlooked.

Effective support for African democracy will involve strengthening institutions with the capacity to formulate competing interests and the courage to respect the risks inherent in competition. In addition, the hazards of post-election pacts can be minimised by considering the following:

  • Sunset clauses can shape time horizon dilemmas and restrain irresponsible economic behaviour, provided that international pressures align with popular preferences. They should not stimulate a sense of scarcity that motivates actors to focus on short-term gains.
  • Extra-constitutional agreements should neither force trust nor adopt sunset provisions that stimulate non-cooperation; compromise and reform need to reflect stakeholders’ interests.
  • Extra-constitutional pacts strip citizens of agency, but citizens can be empowered through electoral reform that emphasises internal party democracy. Political decentralisation can serve the same ends, but its effects could be harmful where ethnic diversity is geographically concentrated.
  • Human rights violations need to be addressed, as marginalising them legitimises the use of violence.
  • It is important to strengthen oversight of the executive branch and horizontal checks through institutions such as legislatures.

Source

LeVan, A. C., 2011, 'Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies', Governance, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 31-53

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