In the first decade of Georgia’s independence, a contradictory mixture of liberal democratic and ethno-nationalist projects characterised President Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime. The failure of these contributed to Shevardnadze’s downfall in the so-called Rose Revolution at the end of 2003. This chapter, in Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, analyses the failure of Georgia’s defence and security policies and the challenges confronting the new Presidency of Mikheil Saakashvilli. It proposes that in the future, Georgia needs a light regular force to patrol its borders and control organised crime.
Eduard Shevardnadze was President of Georgia from 1995 to 2003. He was able to define essential details in defence policy which undermined parliament’s ability to shape the country’s national security strategy. Parliament’s oversight over defence, security and the interior ministries was weak. There was also little coordination between various armed agencies.
Shevardnadze never openly opposed the development of a national security plan, but with a far from conducive local situation, failed to deliver one:
- Georgia was caught in a vicious circle whereby the weak management of the military impeded the formulation of a national security plan, but the absence of such a plan delayed the process of military reform.
- Security documents that were published were marred by contradictory statements, eclecticism, broad generalisations and avoidance of sensitive and crucial issues.
- Shevardnadze was unable to break out of this cycle for three reasons: his corrupt network of control over the political environment would have been endangered by the transparency of a clear national security plan; he wanted to avoid committing to either the West or Russia for fear of alienating one or the other; and he did not seriously commit to democratic values as demonstrated by his toleration of corruption.
- In the end, the corrupt, clientelist and ineffective command and control system of Georgia’s military and security institutions meant that the unpopular leader could not rely on their support when the Georgian people rose up against him in 2003.
Since then, President Saakashvilli has made positive advances in defence and security policy. He has increased the salaries of soldiers to reduce the appeal of corruption, restructured the military and Ministry of Defence, improved transparency through public oversight boards, and has stated his desire for Georgia to become a member of NATO and the EU. However, control of the military remains blurred between key political bodies. Furthermore, although corrupt networks have been seriously damaged, they have not been eliminated and any loophole in the law could open the way to their revival.
The paper makes the following recommendations:
- It makes no sense for Georgia to build a large conventional military force as it does not face the threat of large-scale aggression in the near future. Russia has other means of influencing Georgian domestic affairs.
- Georgia needs a light regular force able to control mountainous borders, a naval defence to control its maritime border, and paramilitary forces to be used against organised crime.
- Part of these forces can also be trained and used for international peacekeeping missions, an important way for a small country such as Georgia to contribute to international security.
- For more remote or hypothetical large-scale threats it would make sense to enhance the existing reserve force. Because of the short term obligatory training that the reserves require, this would have the additional benefit of aiding nation-building in Georgia’s multiethnic setting.
- This book has been translated into Russian as:
Coppieters,B. and Legvold,R. (eds.), 2005, ‘Gosudarstvennost i bezopasnost: Gruziya posle revolyutsii roz’, Moscow, Interdialekt+
It is available at:
http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/statehood/statehood_russian.pdf
(the contribution of David Darchiashvili on pp. 141-181) - This book has been translated into Georgian as:
Coppieters,B. and Legvold,R. (eds.), 2006, ‘saxelmtsipoebrioba da usaprtxoeba: saqartvelo ‘vardebis revoluciis’ shemdeg’, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Tbilisi
It is avilable at:
http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/statehood/statehood_georgian.pdf
