Despite multilateral attempts in the 1990s to institute security sector reform (SSR) in Haiti, lack of elite support, insufficient judicial sector capacity and persistent corruption has led to the current resurgence of violence. This study, published by International Peacekeeping, examines recent international interventions to institute SSR in Haiti. National dialogue with local elites and long-term donor involvement are necessary to ensure that justice, security, development and governance sectors are developed simultaneously to prevent the country from becoming a failed state.
In its 201 years of independence, Haiti has been plagued by poverty, violence, instability, military dictatorships and barely functioning political institutions. Its first democratic elections in 1990, which brought Jean Bertrand Aristede to power, were immediately followed by a coup d’état. Diplomatic efforts by the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) to restore Aristede to power resulted in coup leaders refusing to cede power. In 1994, the UN and a United States (US)-led multinational force entered Haiti. This intervention successfully restored Aristide to office and launched comprehensive SSR to restore public security and establish accountable security institutions.
Haitian SSR included introducing of the concept of human security policing, demobilising the army (FADH) and simultaneously creating an interim security force and permanent national police force (HNP). However, the sheer complexity of this effort and the country’s legacy of political/institutional chaos yielded the following results:
- FADH demobilisation was compromised by the failure of the Haitian government and the US to resolve the issues of which soldiers to retain, and pay and pensions for demobilised soldiers.
- HNP training did not address arrest/detention procedures and human rights law. While trained to be honest and effective, the new police force soon found itself sucked back into the culture of corruption, incompetence and politicisation in which it was embedded.
- Police, court and penal reforms occurred in isolation from each other. In spite of substantial judicial reform funding, rule of law remains nascent; a functional legal system does not exist.
- Security forces’ involvement in drug trafficking remains a central problem for police and state and local governments.
- The country’s political elite did not support the reform process.
Preventing Haiti from becoming a failed state is dependent on long-term US and other donor involvement. Other lessons learned from Haiti’s SSR are:
- Despite laudable reforms, Haiti can not and will not be able to afford to pay for even the most basic policing needs.
- Public mistrust of security institutions is endemic; initial public support for SSR soon reverted back to vigilante justice.
- SSR is only part of the solution; Haiti’s entire governance sector barely functions.
- Reform efforts must meet the expectations of the US, Haiti’s business elite and citizens.
- The future of Haiti is dependent upon the political leadership elite engaging in meaningful dialogue about future needs.
