The response to the civil war in Darfur serves as a warning that division of labour of peacekeeping can have profound negative political implications. This paper, published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, discusses the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) relationship in response to the large-scale challenge of Darfur. The co-dependent relationship between the UN and the AU highlights the dangers of the UN relying on (sub)regional organisations that face even greater operational constraints than the UN itself.
In 2003, the UN Security Council determined that human rights violations in Darfur, Sudan constituted a threat to international and regional peace and security. However, UN Charter limitations and geopolitical realities required that the UN turn to the AU to take the lead in Darfur.
Given the evolving African security architecture and its normative shift from non-interference to ‘non-indifference’, the AU was willing to claim ownership of the Darfur issue. However, both the UN and the AU knew that the AU did not have the authority or capacity to stop the violence in Darfur.
The UN-AU relationship in response to the civil war in Darfur is co-dependent. While each institution depends upon the other to ensure peace and stability in Darfur, their inter-dependence exhibits the following institutional and operational weaknesses:
- While the UN stated that the AU was the lead organisation in Darfur, it did not formalise this delegation of authority.
- The UN provided military, police and civilian advisors, and logistical assistance to the AU in Darfur. It was restricted through its interpretations of the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, from offering critical financial assistance. Given this ad hoc UN support, the AU had to rely on assistance from individual states and other regional organisations.
- This ad hoc relationship between the UN and AU prevented a more effective provision of security for Darfur’s civilian population. The AU military unit (AMIS) in Darfur found itself immediately struggling with inadequate force levels, equipment and resources.
- In part due to inadequate UN recognition of the need to bring the Government of Sudan completely on board as a peacemaking party, the government continues to be a primary impediment for protection of citizens.
- The balance of the working UN-AU military relationship remains tilted towards the UN rather than the AU.
The UN and AU need to assess the following issues that affect security partnerships with (sub)regional organisations in general and the AU in particular:
- There is a risk that the UN will come to rely on burden-sharing opportunities by (sub)regional organisations such as the AU that sometimes face greater operational constraints than the UN itself.
- The UN needs to address the limitations of the use of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in its response to critical human security events such as Darfur.
- The UN and AU need to discuss modalities related to start-up funding, equipment and logistics of AU peacekeeping missions with UN mandates.
