How were security issues managed in the Burundi Peace Talks? What lessons are there for international mediators of other conflicts? Drawing on interviews with negotiators and advisors, this Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue report concludes that it is vital to balance political and technical expertise when addressing security issues and that the interconnectedness of security issues should be recognised.
Several armed groups were involved in the Burundi conflict and a series of deals between different parties were needed to achieve peace. The most important agreements were the multi-party Arusha Agreement in 2000 and the bilateral Pretoria Protocol in 2003.
Discussion of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) measures was hampered during the Arusha talks because hostilities were continuing. As a result, all parties wanted to keep open the option of resorting to arms and DDR was not prioritised.
- A Joint Ceasefire Commission was established in 2003 to oversee DDR. However it comprised only military personnel who did not have the authority to address political issues. As a result, it was prone to deadlock.
- Money was given to ex-combatants in return for arms, however this resulted in some people spending unwisely. As a result, financial support was instead given to associations of ex-combatants and development initiatives.
- All the various peace agreements failed to focus on reintegration. Instead they focussed on integrating ex-combatants into security forces.
- SSR was addressed in the Arusha Agreement. It declared that no ethnic group should have more than 50 per cent representation in the army or police.
- However, during the Pretoria talks international attention focussed primarily on DDR rather than SSR. Criminality amongst members of the security forces is known to be a key factor in civilians’ retention of arms.
In order for security issues to be dealt with effectively in peace processes, a balance must be struck between political and technical expertise. In some instances, invoking the technical nature of security issues can help to move them outside politicised debate. However, in Burundi, the lack of any political expertise on key committees resulted in deadlock and inertia.
- The link between DDR, SSR and arms control should be recognised. In Burundi, civilians’ deep distrust of state security services led them to retain their weapons as a form of insurance.
- DDR is not the only tool which can be used to reduce violence and control arms. Even if forces are still fighting, it may be possible to secure general agreement on other issues such as legal norms for arms possession.
- In Burundi, some actors argued that weapons control was a domestic concern and therefore not a matter for the peace process. International mediators should urge against such thinking.
- The Burundi process was hampered by a lack of up-to-date expertise. The provision of dedicated impartial security advisers to peace processes could be one way to overcome this problem.
- In Burundi, the interests of survivors were overlooked. All parties should take responsibility for creating opportunities for survivors to state their needs as part of peace processes.
- Reintegration should not be overlooked, even if many ex-combatants are to be reintegrated into armed forces. Veterans associations and ex-combatant-led NGOs can play a mobilising role.
