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Home»Document Library»The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army

The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army

Library
Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro
2009

Summary

What progress has the Afghan National Army (ANA) made in terms of manpower, infrastructure and equipment, training, operational proficiency and public perceptions? What challenges still remain in rebuilding the ANA? This report from the RAND Corporation offers an assessment of the progress of the ANA to date. It argues that the ANA remains a work in progress, but is an indispensable part of the ultimate security of Afghanistan.

Since the outset of the recent conflict in Afghanistan, the essential role of an Afghan military force has been recognised. Considerable effort and expense has therefore gone into building up the ANA. Assessments of that effort vary, but it is widely accepted that the ANA will be central to the long-term success of the central government. Without an effective army, Afghanistan will slip back into chaos.

The progress of the ANA to date in terms of manpower, infrastructure, equipment, training, operational proficiency and public perceptions can be assessed as follows:

  • The ANA appears to be on track to meet its manpower goals. However, several obstacles must be overcome, including achieving ethnic balance and funding salaries as well as the necessary infrastructure, for an additional 40,000 soldiers.
  • Work on infrastructure lags the goals set, with only 40 per cent of planned projects complete or under way. Nevertheless, military infrastructure is being put in place and represents a much higher standard than that for the general population.
  • Equipment remains an issue, with combat units lacking a significant proportion of essential items. Subsequent commitments from the US to provide additional equipment promise to ease the situation. Specialised units appear to be well-equipped.
  • After a slow start, training appears to be improving. Training centre capacity appears adequate and programmes of instruction are appropriate. The most glaring shortfall is in operational mentor and liaison teams staffed by NATO countries other than the US.
  • The operational proficiency of the ANA appears to have improved substantially from its early days. However, ANA assumption of primary responsibility for national security is still a long way off. Logistics remains a weakness.
  • Polls indicate that Afghans’ perception of security and support for foreign forces are on the decline. However, promisingly and importantly, the Afghan people have a positive perception of the ANA.

It will clearly take a number of years for the ANA to develop the capability to assume primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s security. NATO and the US cannot simply walk away from Afghanistan without jeopardising what has been accomplished so far. Considerations on the way forward for the ANA include the following:

  • Some form of security assistance will have to continue for the foreseeable future. Such assistance will likely include unit advisers at some level and sophisticated combat support in the form of close air support.
  • The size of the ANA remains an issue. To maintain their sovereignty and security Afghans continue to foresee a need for a much larger force even than that being trained and equipped.
  • Afghanistan’s GDP is only US$11 billion and the annual federal budget is $4 billion, much of which is foreign aid. An international commitment will likely be necessary in order to sustain the ANA, its equipment and infrastructure for the foreseeable future.

Source

Younossi O., Thruelsen P.D., Vaccaro J., Sollinger J.M., Grady B., 2009, 'The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army', RAND Corporation

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