How has Bhutan been combating insurgents within its territory and what impact has this had on relations with its powerful neighbours? This American Political Science Association publication examines Bhutanese actions against insurgents and its cooperation with India. It argues that insurgency problems stem from South Asian nations’ inability to forge united states with assimilated minorities. For small and landlocked states like Bhutan, it is imperative that regional unity is fostered with a bolstering of its diplomatic capacity.
South Asian states are generally more prone to innumerable dangers such as insurgency, terrorism and other related issues. This is due to their unstable socio-economic and political systems, underdevelopment and their vulnerable geo-strategic location. Bhutan faces the presence of dissident military organisations from Assam, such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Other north-eastern states of India have created problems for both India and Bhutan. The basic demand of these organisations is independence from India. They are fighting against the Indian Army, the Government of India (GOI) as well as the Government of Assam and its Police force.
To effectively counter the secessionist challenge from Assamese militants and their hideouts in the Indo-Bhutan border, India and Bhutan have initiated a Joint Indo-Bhutan Army (JIBA) operation in December 2003. Other aspects and developments of this join cooperation have included the following:
- The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB) has fostered ever closer relationships with the GOI. The King of Bhutan for instance informed the Prime Minister of India about impending action against Indian insurgents.
- Bhutan deployed nearly 600 militias along with regular soldiers to fight Indian separatists in the five southern districts of the Kingdom.
- The GOI has agreed to cooperate with Bhutan. While appreciating Bhutan’s efforts to counter the insurgents from its soil, the GOI assured that Bhutanese civilians moving through Assam will be protected against retaliatory attacks by the ULFA.
- The JIBA operation compelled the senior leaders of the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), who had fled their camps after the military offensive from Bhutan, to surrender to the West Bengal police.
- Indo–Bhutan cooperation has also provided amnesty to those who surrendered to the Indian army or army officials.
With the continued threat of insurgency in the South Asian region, it is essential that nations in the region strive towards mutual cooperation. In such a scenario, the possible strategies and options which are left to small and landlocked states such as Bhutan include:
- Developing a basic diplomatic capability as an important strategy for survival.
- Improving the organisational structure of its foreign ministry, the character and calibre of its diplomats, and striving towards understanding and mastering the process of decision-making.
- Avoiding subversive acts, insurgencies or possible external threats. Small states should follow the strategy of national and spiritual resistance and cultural integration. This can be helped by a homogenous population, solid national traditions and a common language, culture and civilization.
- Broad-basing relations with a cross-section of the international community. For instance, Bhutan has established non-residential diplomatic relations with many Asian and European nations, thereby pre-empting the possibility of it being used as a base for third-party political manoeuvrings.
